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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters, each of which is pertinent to the topic of how
value is created to consumers and platform competition in the same-day grocery delivery
market. All chapters make use of tools from empirical Industrial Organization. All data
describing choices made by consumers used for both empirical evidence and demand esti-
mation presented in chapters 1 and 2, respectively, pertain to the Nielsen Company (US),
LLC and marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. In the first chapter, I use the roll-out
of two major same-day delivery services in several metro areas in the United Stated to study
the impact of these new alternatives on consumers’ retailer choice. To do so, I construct a
new dataset with the timing of entry decisions of two grocery delivery platforms combine
this geographic entry information with scanner data on consumer purchases to evaluate how
store choices change once these new services are introduced. To measure the importance of
user switching costs, in the second chapter, I estimate a demand model where consumers
incur costs to update their delivery platforms choices over time. I extend Katz (2007)’s
store choice model to a dynamic setting where, in addition to choosing bundles of products
and retailers, consumers also pay a sunk cost to subscribe to memberships that augment
their choice set of online retail alternatives. In addition to the revealed preference rela-
tions used in Katz (2007) which identify utility parameters, I estimate costs associated with
subscriptions (fees and switching costs) using a second set of moments. I construct these
moments using revealed preference conditions which compare the utility of maintaining the
consumer’s subscription choice to the utility of switching. To estimate switching costs, I
use constraints that impose rational switching behavior identifying bounds on differential
continuation values between subscriptions. I present evidence that switching costs are sub-
stantial: fewer than 50% of customers switch to a competitor in the face of savings of up
to $40 per purchase. Using the model, I find that switching costs significantly affect con-
sumer platform use. In the absence of switching costs, consumers would alternate between
platforms from one purchase to the next ten times more often. By itself, this suggests a
potential harm from the major firm’s acquisition as lock-in would allow the combined firm
to exercise market power in the future. In the third chapter, I model firm decisions as
a dynamic entry game in which consumers’ transition across platforms, predicted by the
estimated demand model, governs the law of motion of firm revenues. Firms then compete
in continuous time across independent markets in a similar fashion to Arcidiacono et al.
(2016). I use this empirical framework to conduct a retrospective analysis of this recent ac-
quisition. I show that an important aspect of the welfare impact of Big Tech’s acquisition of
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the national grocery chain was Grocer Partner’s strategic entry response. Big Tech’s main
rival could have responded to the merger by either conceding or entering markets more
rapidly. When met with the competitive threat presented by the merger, Grocer Partner’s
own intent to build a loyal customer base increases this firm’s incentive to chase a first-
mover advantage by entering new geographical markets earlier. Moreover, because Grocer
Partner’s entry costs are low, this firm is able to pursue this accelerated entry strategy
giving rise to fierce competition for new markets. I find that the acquisition significantly
increased both firms’ speed of entry cross new markets, giving consumers earlier access to
the services and generating important welfare gains in the short run. Specifically, had the
acquisition not happened, both firms would have entered new markets over two years later,
on average. The combined costs associated with the two firms’ earlier entry due to the
acquisition amount to a loss of $624 M in producer surplus. However, consumer benefits
across markets that were served earlier due to this merger are larger, representing a total
welfare gain of $846 M. Additionally, the fact that this merger allowed the large online
retailer to enter multiple markets earlier provides an explanation for the premium paid for
the acquisition. Moreover, until this merger occurred, this retail chain was Grocer Partner’s
largest affiliated retailer, giving it access to approximately 23 million consumers. This sup-
ports the fact that Grocer Partner anticipated how the acquisition would affect its ability to
serve certain markets and reacted through earlier entry. I perform a second counterfactual
that simulates a potential horizontal merger between Big Tech and Grocer Partner resulting
in a monopoly. I find that, due to the lack of significant competitive threat, the monopolist
would not have an incentive to serve markets early. This shows the role of competition in
the timing of entry of these services. I also show that consumer losses due to delayed entry
by the monopolist are larger than cost savings from this merger. In both analysis, the focus
is on entry timing and firms do not choose prices in the model. For this reason, this paper is
limited in its ability to capture possible future harm to consumers through prices. However,
I use the demand model to show how consumers’ substitution patterns as response to price
changes under switching costs shed light onto issue. I find evidence that competition is
important to keep prices low, especially if the firm’ business model relies on economies of
scale. This paper contributes to the literature on the role of consumer inertia in competi-
tion by measuring the importance of switching costs for entry strategies in a nascent market
and highlighting the implications of this mechanism for consumer welfare. There is a large
body of literature relating switching costs to price competition. There is also a theoretical
literature relating switching costs to other dimensions of firm strategic behavior, including
entry decisions: Klemperer (1988), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Klemperer (1995), Farrell
and Klemperer (2007), Klemperer (1987) and Schmidt (2010). Furthermore, switching costs
are deemed theoretically important for preserving advantages to early movers: Lieberman
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and Montgomery (1988), Shapiro and Varian (2000), Amit and Zott (2001). However, the
implications of switching costs for entry decisions have been studied less extensively em-
pirically and measurement of first-mover advantages is sparse (Gómez and Máıcas (2011)).
This paper also relates to the literature measuring the importance of entry timing to firm
decisions. In my setting, the source of early entry incentives is explicitly present in the
demand model. I model the mechanism driving consumers’ inertia and its relationship with
firms’ strategic behavior. There is a vast theoretical work on this topic since the early tech-
nology diffusion literature (Reinganum (1981a)), (Reinganum (1981b)) and (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985)). The empirical literature on this issue is much sparser due to the difficulty
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Chapter 1
The Grocery Delivery Market:
New Data on Services’ Entry
Patterns and Consumers’ Choice
Patterns
1.1 Introduction
In this section, I provide relevant details about the same-day delivery market. There is a
large variety of delivery services, most of which specialized in grocery delivery. Most of
them are constrained to one region of the US, concentrated in not more than a handful of
large metropolitan areas. The two services that are studied in this paper have a nation-wide
presence and, at the same time, a speed of delivery in the order of hours. This nation-wide
scale makes the geographic richness of the data on entry patterns of the two firms and
consumer choices quite unique.
Typically, grocery delivery services have subscription plans. Costumers pay a yearly or
monthly flat-rate fee and get unlimited deliveries for that period. There is, however, a lot
of heterogeneity in business models. A lot of services deliver only from one large brick-and-
mortar retailer. Examples of large retailers that have their own delivery service include
Walmart, Costco and, more recently, Target and Sam’s Club. Many smaller grocery chains
also offer their own delivery or pick-up services. Another type of delivery service business
model are online platforms that specialize in fulfillment and operate through partnerships
with multiple local stores. Examples include: Instacart, Peapod and Google Express. Fi-
nally, there are delivery platforms that are typical online retailers operating centralized
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distribution systems, making deliveries from a warehouse. This is the case for Amazon’s
Prime Now and Amazon Fresh as well as Jet.com. The firms studied in this paper represent
two of these distinct business models: Grocer Partner operates through partnerships with
local stores and Big Tech is a traditional online retailer with specialized distribution cen-
ters. Both have subscription services. Big Tech’s subscription is bundled with a multitude
of other services offered by the same online retailer and is a pre-requisite to use the service.
However, Grocer Partner can be used without a subscription at the cost of a per-trip fee.
For both services, annual fees range between $100-150 and Grocer Partner’s trip-based fees
range between $5-8. The actual cost of the service will depend on whether the household
has a subscription or not. Since that information is missing for the households in my sam-
ple, I approximate the cost of Big Tech dividing the yearly cost of the subscription by the
average number of trips made by users in a year. For the Grocer Partner firm, I use the
trip-based fee. Those two fees are included in the cost of the bundle when estimating the
demand model in chapter (2).
1.2 Data
To study competition between same-day grocery delivery platforms, I use data on their
geographical roll-out since they were each first launched. Two firms stand out in this
market both due to the fact that they have polar opposite cost structures and because they
are by far the largest firms in terms of U.S. population coverage (figure B.13). These firms
compete in many markets across the country (figure B.10) and their entry patterns reflect
their strategic considerations relative to the other. Big Tech is the first firm: a traditional
online retailer building logistical operations for groceries and sourcing products from its own
newly built fulfillment centers dedicated exclusively to same-day grocery delivery. Grocer
Partner is the second: an independent two-sided platform with massive geographic coverage
and sourcing products from its grocery store partners1. The business model differences
between Big Tech and Grocer Partner translate into important cost structure differences.
The former incurs large entry costs associated with each new fulfillment center (FC) and,
for this reason, should benefit significantly from returns to scale. Meanwhile, the latter
incurs very low entry cost as partner stores are already established prior to entry in each
market. These cost structure differences are important for the entry strategies available to
each firm and for how the mergers studied in this paper impact competition and consumer
welfare.
The first data source used in this paper is the Nielsen Consumer Panel Dataset (Homescan).
1In 2017, this firm’s service was available to 70% of the U.S. population. This is calculated directly using
the availability by zip code scraped from their website and Census data on population by zip code.
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This is a transaction-level dataset that spans 2004-2016, including around 60,000 households
annually. For each shopping trip made by panelists, there is detailed information on the
products purchased - including UPC code and description as well as price paid. Panelists
also report the retailer, the location of the store visited and the type of store (e.g. Grocery,
Department store, Online Shopping, Discount Store and Drug Store). The data also includes
household characteristics such as income brackets, presence of children in the household,
age and education of heads of household, city and zip code.
I use a variety of data sources to construct a panel of availability of the two delivery services
over time and by zip code. The first source is public information available on the official
websites of both online platforms. I test over 20,000 zip codes on these websites to get the set
of zip codes served, once the service is available in a given metro area. To recover the exact
launch dates for each metro area, I collect several press releases, newspapers and scrape four
years of posts on social media pages. Grocer Partner makes gradual expansions within the
metro areas in the years after the first launch. For that reason, I use this firm’s social media
posts to recover the exact launch dates by neighborhood. With this, I construct a panel
that spans 2012-2017 and includes all U.S. metropolitan areas entered by the platforms and
tens of thousands of zip codes.
Finally, I match households in the Nielsen Homescan to the services’ availability dataset
using their zip code. Figures (B.11-B.12) show an example of the resulting delivery coverage
by zip code for a metro area in the sample in 2015. To estimate demand, I work with
27 metro areas that include 680 zip codes served by Big Tech, corresponding to 4,708
households in the Homescan and, 640 zip codes served by Grocer Partner, corresponding to
4,693 households in the Homescan. A subset of these households are users of one or both
services and their purchases through these new retail alternatives are observed in the data.
The data used to estimate the model in chapter (2) includes all purchases from retailers
Big Tech and Grocer Partner as well as a random sample of purchases made through other
retailers by both users and non-users of the same-day delivery services.
I use the count of establishments by NAICS code for every zip code in the Zip Code Business
Patterns 2016 (ZBP) for complementary information. The ZBP data are drawn from tax
records, the U.S. Census Company Organization Survey, and other administrative data. I
use it to construct the number of relevant retail alternatives within a 1 and 5 miles radius of
each household by computing straight-line distances between the geocoded centroid of every
zip code in the data and all other zip codes within those radius. Then, for every household
zip code, I sum the number of retailers in the relevant NAICS codes located within those
radius. These pair-wise distances between zip codes are also used to compute distances
traveled by consumers to the stores they visit. The Homescan contains 5-digit zip codes
for households but only 3-digit ones for stores, for privacy concerns. So, stores visited are
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assumed to be located the closest 5-digit zip code that starts with the 3-digits provided for
that store in the Homescan.
Next , I show evidence that consumer choices are motivated by subscription timing and of
the inertia associated with it followed by evidence of the firms’ strategic interaction through
entry timing.
1.3 Regression Analysis and Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy presented in this section consists of exploring the before and after
shopping behavior of households that gain access and use same-day delivery services. At the
same time, non-users of the services within the delivery radius of the services and households
in near-by zip codes that fall just outside of the delivery radius are used to control for time
confounders.
1.3.1 Substitution of Offline Channels
In this section, I provide an empirical strategy to identify the causal effect of the availabil-
ity of same-day delivery on households’ choice of retail channel. The strategy consists in
looking at the frequency of shopping trips to different types of retailing channels made by
households who use the services Big Tech and Grocer Partner, before and after each service
is launched. Figure (B.1) shows how the timing of when purchases from these new retailers
first appear in the Homescan lines-up with the launch dates collected (time 0). For users of
each service that are located in different metro areas, the date in which each service is made
available will be different. Moreover, within the same metro areas, there are households
located in adjacent zip codes where one of these zip codes falls within a service’s delivery
radius and the other does not. Hence, at a given period t, the sample contains: households
that have access to one or two services and households that have access to none. The latter
is divided between the two previously mentioned groups: households that will in some later
period be served by Grocer Partner and/or Big Tech and households that will not but, live
close to some that do. These two types of non-served households are used to control for time
confounders that can be associated with oscillations in a retail channel’s attractiveness in a
given period. Meanwhile, the effect of interest is driven by changes in choices across retail
channels for households that become users of the new services once they become available.
The regression analysis uses the same retail channels used to estimate the revealed prefer-
ence model in chapter (2): Grocery Stores, Discount Stores and Drug Stores. Those are
the most likely channels to be close substitutes to same-day online delivery services. The
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purpose of this exercise is twofold: firstly, to check the existence of a direct substitution be-
tween those channels and the new alternatives and, secondly, to point out shopping pattern
differences that exist between households of distinct income levels.
The regression estimated is the following:
Pr(Channelit = j) = β0 + β1 ∗ 1GrocerPartnerit + β2 ∗ 1BigTechit + αi + αt + εit (1.1)
An observation is a purchase made by household i in period t. The regression above is
done for each channel type and income group separately. Hence, in each regression, the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for each observation in the data corresponding
to a shopping trip associated with that channel. I regress this dummy, for each channel
and each income group, on two indicator variables: one for Big Tech and one for Grocer
Partner firm. Each service indicator has to satisfy three conditions: the service has to be
available in user i’s metro area at time t, i’s zip code has to be within that service’s delivery
radius and i has to be a user of that service2. Aside from these two variables of interest, all
regressions include household fixed-effects and month-specific fixed-effects. Due to the high
number of fixed-effects, I opt for a linear probability model instead of a non-linear approach
such as Logit or Probit.
As previously mentioned, there are important differences in the delivery logistics used by
each service and their relationship with offline retail. This translates into differences in the
zip codes they choose to serve and the type of users they consequently have: table (B.13)
shows how the demographic characteristics of delivery service users differ from the average
Nielsen panelist in 2015-2016. The Grocer Partner firm, as it relies on the pre-existing
retailing alternatives in an area, is most likely to enter zip codes that have more grocery
stores, discount stores and drug stores. Those are also wealthier zip codes, as can be seen
on table (B.5). Conversely, by having a centralized distribution system, the Big Tech firm
serves a continuous radius centered in the downtown area of the cities it operates in: as
shown in figure (B.4). This is more likely to include lower income neighborhoods, even if
not purposefully. This is reflected on the characteristics of users: Big Tech firm has a larger
share of users who are in the lowest income group (< 45K) than the Grocer Partner firm, as
shown in table B.13. Moreover, as it is well documented in the food deserts literature, low
income households are more likely to shop for groceries at drug stores and discount stores,
instead of supermarkets or grocery stores. Whether the reason for this is differences in
retail availability or differences in demand across income groups (as posed by Allcott et al.
2A household is defined as a user of a service if they have made a purchase through that service at any
point in time.
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(2018)), these features will result in substitution patterns that differ across income groups
and the two new services. For this reason, the regressions presented show that channels
more likely to be replaced by the new retail alternatives differ across groups.
The regression results are presented in tables (B.17) - (B.19). The coefficients on each firm’s
availability indicator represent the change in the probability that a user of that service buys
from a retailer in channel j after the service is available. The launch of the Big Tech service
has effects across all income groups and all three offline channels. Notably, the probability
of a household in the lowest income group making a grocery trip falls by 35 percentage
points once the delivery service is available. For the highest income group, the Big Tech
service doesn’t seem to be a close substitute for grocery trips. However, the Grocer Partner
service is: users of this service in this income group make 33% less grocery trips once this
service is available. Discount stores see a drop of 8-11% in trips across all income groups
when the Big Tech service becomes available.
Finally, the logistic differences between Grocer Partner and Big Tech firm also impact
their product selection. At least during the period between 2015 and 2016, even though
Big Tech firm had a very large catalog of general merchandise as well as dry and frozen
groceries, it had a very limited selection of fresh produce. Grocer Partner firm, however,
had multiple partnerships with grocery stores, notably some of the largest in the country
and some known for the quality of their fresh produce department. Given that high income
households, even when shopping at the same retailer3, buy 0.62 standard deviation more
items in this category, Grocer Partner firm is a closer substitute for grocery shopping than
Big Tech firm in this income group.
1.3.2 Distance to Retail and Use of New Services
In this section, I discuss the role of distance to offline retail as a determinant of demand
for new online delivery services. There is large variation in the number retailers available
through the Grocer Partner platform across locations as well as variation in how close
consumers are to offline retail, including to stores that have a partnership with Grocer
Partner (see figure (B.6)). I show how the probability of a consumer using new online
delivery services depends on the distance to offline retail substitutes and, in the case of the
Grocer Partner service, how offline partnered stores are - to some extent - complements.
I use the number of stores within 1 mile of each consumer to measure the number of
alternatives available and use distance to closest Grocer Partner partner store to identify
the existence of substitution between the new service and the retailers it relies on. Since
distance to partnered stores also determine availability of the Grocer Partner service and
3See tables (B.11) and (B.12)
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the number of retailers the consumer can choose on this platform (see figures (B.7) and
(B.8)), I also control for the number of partners offered through the Grocer Partner service
in the consumer’s zip code.
Table (B.20) shows the result of the linear probability regressions for Grocer Partner firm.
In the most complete specification, the probability that a consumer makes a purchase
using the Grocer Partner service depends on all the variables described above: distance to
retail, number of Grocer Partner partners offered in the consumer’s zip code and number
of stores within 1 mile. The main endogeneity issue in identifying the effect of proximity
to offline retail on use new online services is due to the fact both availability and quality
of these new services can also depend on proximity of the consumer to stores. Indeed,
controlling for the number of partners in the consumer’s zip code impacts the coefficient on
distance in the expected direction. According to the most complete specification, a consumer
located at 5.6 miles from the closest Grocer Partner affiliated store is 0.68 percentage points
(approximately 5 standard deviations) more likely to purchase from Grocer Partner firm
than a consumer located within 1 mile. Any additional store (this includes only grocery
stores, discount stores and drug stores) within 1 mile also impacts negatively the probability
of purchasing from the Grocer Partner service (0.33 p.p. per store - 2.7 standard deviations).
However, having more partners impacts the probability of purchase positively (0.37 p.p or
3 standard deviations per additional alternative offered). This means that zip codes that
are located closer to partner stores are offered more alternatives within the Grocer Partner
service and, are more likely to use this service for this reason but, the closer they are located
to these stores, the less likely they are to use the online service.
Table (B.21) presents similar results for the Big Tech service. As this service does not rely
on partnerships with local stores, it is strictly a substitute to brick-and-mortar retail. The
number of Grocer Partner affiliates offered in a zip code and the proximity to Grocer Partner
affiliated stores both seem to have no effect on the demand for the Big Tech service. However,
the overall number of offline alternatives within 1 mile (0.32 p.p. or 1.8 standard deviations
per additional alternative) and the proximity to overall brick-and-mortar alternatives both
correlate to the probability of purchasing from the Big Tech service. An additional store
within 1 mile reduces the probability of purchasing from the Big Tech service by 0.33
percentage points (approximately 1.8 standard deviations).
1.4 Consumer Lock-in
In this section, I show evidence that consumer choices are motivated by subscription timing
and of the inertia associated with it followed by evidence of the firms’ strategic interaction
through entry timing.
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Table B.32 shows the frequency of switching occurrences across platforms where an observa-
tion is a purchase. Switching patterns show that consumers rarely switch between services
offered by different firms. In over 98% of purchases, consumers choose to use an alternative
they have used recently. Only in 0.18% of purchases in the data consumers choose to buy
from Grocer Partner when they have used a service provided by Big Tech in the last three
months. Table B.33 shows the number of days after the first purchase using one of the two
services it takes a switcher to switch. This table shows that the first time a consumer uses
either service is likely to be when they first subscribe to that service. Indeed, switching, if it
occurs, happens around what would be the expiration date of a monthly or yearly subscrip-
tion, assuming the user subscribes when the use the service for the first time. Switching
rates measured in each of these two manners are quite low, consistent with other sources
of data4. Identification of the demand model also relies on variation in choices made by
consumers across demographic groups and geographic characteristics. As previously men-
tioned, there are important differences in the delivery logistics used by each service and
their relationship with offline retail. This translates into differences in the zip codes they
choose to serve and the type of users they consequently have. As Grocer Partner relies
on the pre-existing stores in an area, it is more likely to enter zip codes that have more
grocery stores, discount stores and drug stores. Those also tend to be wealthier zip codes.
Conversely, by having a centralized distribution system, Big Tech serves a continuous radius
centered in the downtown area of the cities it operates in. This is more likely to include
low income neighborhoods, even if not purposefully. This is reflected on the characteristics
of users: Big Tech has a larger share of users in the lowest income group (< 45K) than the
Grocer Partner.
In figure B.9 I show how switching behavior relates to price changes of the bundle purchased.
I compute the difference between prices paid and prices at the alternative platform for
consumers that have access to both choices. The figure maps price differentials against an
indicator of switching associated with the individual and a smoothed outcome measure of
the switching probability. Individuals that have purchased bundles with higher differential
prices are more likely to eventually switch between platforms. This is preliminary evidence
that switching is at least partially driven by prices and, therefore, rational. However,
high price differences still predict a switching probability below 50%, indicating that small
price differences are not enough to induce switching. Moreover, these differences in prices
across retailers are an important source of variation identifying parameters in the model.
These two facts indicate that price comparisons for the bundle chosen induce switching
but, at the same time, consumers may also incur switching costs not captured by bundle
4No grocery delivery company shared more than 13% percent of another company’s customers (2019):
https://secondmeasure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/GroceryDelivery-chart3 v2.png
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price differences. These additional costs may be due to subscription sign-up fees or other
non-monetary costs such as the time spend comparing prices across platforms. I do not
distinguish between such types of costs in the demand model. Instead, I infer the combined
sunk costs that rationalize switching behavior in the data in order to reproduce demand
dynamics under the assumption that the price scheme is unchanged.
1.5 Evidence of Entry Timing as a Strategic Decision
In this section, I describe how entry and coverage patterns differ between the two firms
and provide suggestive evidence of how they interact strategically. Figure (B.10) shows the
presence of same-day grocery delivery services across the US in 2017.
As previously mentioned, the two platforms competing in the game presented in chapter
(3) have very distinct cost structures. This is relevant to understand how they make use
of different strategies impacting their speed of entry. Big Tech makes use of fulfillment
centers dedicated to same-day grocery delivery. Before this platform is launched in a new
location, it builds a new fulfillment center and traces a continuous delivery radius around
it. Grocer Partner makes use of pre-existing stores belonging to retail partners. Figures
(B.11-B.12) show how this impacts their geographic footprint. Whereas the former has a
continuous coverage, the latter has often pockets of covered zip codes geographically close.
These business model differences are relevant to understand the entry strategies each firm
can make use of and their costs. Big Tech’s model is expected to lead to high entry costs and
distribution costs that decrease significantly with population density. Conversely, Grocer
Partner ’s implies low entry costs, as no infrastructure needs to be built to operate. This also
means that the speed with which each firm can make entry decisions is likely to be different.
For example, if Grocer Partner believes Big Tech is likely to enter a certain market soon,
it is more likely to enter early as a response if its entry cost is low. The evidence presented
next is compatible with these features of the firms’ costs.
The motivating evidence of the two platforms’ strategic interaction uses the timing of the
event in which Big Tech acquired a grocery chain. Around the time of the announcement,
there is a spike in the number of Grocer Partner ’s entry decisions across new markets,
as shown in figure (B.16). Because this firm’s business model relies on making use of
pre-existing stores, its entry cost should be low. Consequently, it reacts to the rival’s
announcement immediately with entry across new markets where, with the acquisition,
Big Tech is expected to enter sooner. Effectively, because the grocery chain had a multi-
year contract with Grocer Partner at the time of the acquisition, Big Tech can only start
making use of the newly acquired stores as delivery hubs six months after the acquisition.
Figure (B.15) shows the faster rate of entry once the firm has its entry cost reduced by the
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acquisition.
This is the key motivating evidence for the first merger counterfactual conducted using the
duopoly game. It shows that the timing of the firms’ entry decisions and, in particular, their
strategic interaction in this dimension can be important. Combined with the motivating
evidence of lock-in, this justifies the choice of a model where forming a base of subscribers
is a driving force of entry timing and where the consequences of a merger can be evaluated
in terms of strategic entry timing. Moreover, in the model I allow for entry costs to vary
over time to capture how firms’ ability to grow may be evolving over time.
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Chapter 2
The Demand Model: Combining
Dynamic Subscription Decisions
with Static Store Choices
2.1 Introduction
To measure the importance of user switching costs, I estimate a demand model where
consumers incur costs to update their delivery platforms choices over time. I extend Katz
(2007)’s store choice model to a dynamic setting where, in addition to choosing bundles
of products and retailers, consumers also pay a sunk cost to subscribe to memberships
that augment their choice set of online retail alternatives. In addition to the revealed
preference relations used in Katz (2007) which identify utility parameters, I estimate costs
associated with subscriptions (fees and switching costs) using a second set of moments. I
construct these moments using revealed preference conditions which compare the utility
of maintaining the consumer’s subscription choice to the utility of switching. To estimate
switching costs, I use constraints that impose rational switching behavior identifying bounds
on differential continuation values between subscriptions. I present evidence that switching
costs are substantial: fewer than 50% of customers switch to a competitor in the face
of savings of up to $40 per purchase. Using the model, I estimate that switching costs
range between $ 4 and $ 14 per purchase. These values include sunk costs associated with
subscription fees which I estimate jointly with potential non-monetary switching costs to
rationalize consumers’ behavior. Overall, these costs represent the dollar value forgone by
consumers who do not switch in the presence of lower prices for products at the alternative
service. I find that these costs significantly affect consumer platform use: in the absence
of switching costs, consumers would alternate between platforms from one purchase to the
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next ten times more often. By itself, this suggests a potential harm from the major firm’s
acquisition as lock-in would allow the combined firm to exercise market power in the future.
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of consumer inertia in competition by
measuring the importance of switching costs for entry strategies in a nascent market and
highlighting the implications of this mechanism for consumer welfare. There is a large
body of literature relating switching costs to price competition1. There is also a theoretical
literature relating switching costs to other dimensions of firm strategic behavior, including
entry decisions: Klemperer (1988), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Klemperer (1995), Farrell
and Klemperer (2007), Klemperer (1987) and Schmidt (2010). Furthermore, switching costs
are deemed theoretically important for preserving advantages to early movers: Lieberman
and Montgomery (1988), Shapiro and Varian (2000), Amit and Zott (2001). However,
the implications of switching costs for entry decisions have been studied less extensively
empirically and measurement of first-mover advantages is sparse Gómez and Máıcas (2011).
2.2 Demand Model
Many grocery delivery services require a subscription membership payed monthly or yearly.
This is the case for Big Tech’s grocery delivery service: consumers need a membership
to a set of benefits and this subscription includes grocery delivery at no additional cost.
Grocer Partner offers a yearly subscription membership that costs approximately $150 and
includes unlimited delivery at no additional cost. Since consumers’ subscription status are
not directly observed, I infer it through purchases. Consumers in the data don’t switch
back and forth between the two services and multi-homing (using more than one platform
simultaneously) is negligible in the sample. Consequently, I only consider the three mutually
exclusive alternatives of consumer status: s ∈ {No Subscription (0), Big Tech (B), Grocer
Partner (G)}. This variable is an indicator of whether the consumer has purchased from
either firm in the past.
The demand model reflects the different aspects of consumer choice observed in the data.
As an observation is a purchase decision for a panelist, there isn’t a fixed period between
choices. For this reason, I assume consumers receive utility shocks associated with products
they might want to buy in continuous time. A purchase decision then occurs as a result.
Conditional on a purchase being observed in the data, I model the consumer’s utility over
the observed and unobserved aspects of the decision: subscription, retailer and bundle of
products chosen. I then use a revealed preference approach to identify the relevant sets of
parameters.
1Some theoretical and empirical examples include Rosenthal (1982), MacKay and Remer (2019), Bagwell
et al. (1997), Cabral (2012). For surveys, see Cabral (2016) and Miguel Villas-Boas (2015).
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2.2.1 Consumer Problem
For each consumer i, consider a dynamic single-agent decision problem in which time is
continuous and an arrival process governs when decision opportunities indexed by t = 1, 2, ...
are made. At any time, the state for i is the subscription status inherited from the last
decision period s ∈ {0, B,G}. When a decision opportunity arrives, the consumer chooses
to update the subscription s′, conditional on the current state s and a random utility
component ε. The individual also makes shopping decisions conditional on the updated





The indirect utility is in the spirit of Katz (2007). There is a structural random utility
component which is bundle, consumer and time-specific: ε. To not burden the notation, I
omit all individual and time subscripts and discuss below which components are observed
at the individual and time levels. The utility of purchasing a bundle of products b at retailer
j is:
ubj = Vb + (−1 + αY )Pbj +Xj(β0 + Zβ1) + Tj(γ + η) + εb, (2.2)
Pbj is the expenditure required to buy b at j which is specific to purchase t and the price
paid by the individual is observed. This includes any promotions i may have received to buy
the bundle, which are observed in the data. The baseline price elasticity is normalized to be
−1 which means that the remaining parameters are expressed in dollar terms. Additionally,
the elasticity is allowed to differ according to the individual’s income Y and the parameter
α.
Z1 are demographic variables which affect i’s preferences for retailer characteristicsXj which
are subsumed by a fixed-effect for each retailer. This fixed-effect provides an estimate for any
differences in quality not captured by other observables2. The retailer fixed-effect controls
are then used to address the price endogeneity issue associated with quality and evaluate
how retailer preferences vary across demographic groups. Tj is the distance between i and
retailer j’s closest store, if j is a brick-and-mortar retailer. The utility of the bundle has one
constant and one random component. Vb is the mean utility associated with the bundle of
goods purchased. εb is the random utility component associated b observed by the consumer
when making the purchase in t but, unknown to the researcher. Consequently, this error is
2This is a control for what would be the unobserved quality of the product ξj in a typical discrete choice
setting.
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a high-dimensional object defined over all possible products the consumer can buy b ∈ B in
a decision period. Finally, η is a constant component of i’s in travel cost also unobserved
by the researcher and approached econometrically as random coefficient, as done in Katz
(2007).
A1: Unobserved preferences for bundles and retailers are separable.
A1 is assumed in specification (2.2). This is same assumption imposed in Katz (2007) in
order to perform the revealed preference approach to identify the parameters in (2.2). This
means that retailer quality does not depend on the bundle purchased and can, therefore, be
measured as a retailer fixed-effect. Even though retailer quality doesn’t vary with b, prices
vary across retailers, bundles and periods. If consumers have some information about prices
before making decisions, this rationalizes the fact that consumers don’t always buy the
same things and from the same retailers. First, this means that the cheapest retailer for a
particular bundle isn’t the same across periods. Secondly, after considering both prices and
other dimensions of retailer quality that are invariant across bundles, the optimal retailer
choice can vary across periods. The problem solved by consumer during a decision period
is then:
V (s, ε) = max
s′∈S
{us′(ε)− C(s, s′) + βE[V (s′, ε′)|s′]}, (2.3)
Where C(s, s′) is a cost function which depends on the state and the subscription choice.
The discount factor β combines the expected length of the random interval between the
current trip and the next decision and the consumer’s is the discount factor in continuous
time. To compute the discount factor prior to estimating the demand model, I make an
assumption about the arrival process of purchases and take the expectation over the random
interval between purchases and the number of future trips3.
The cost of subscription changes is assumed to be:
C(s, s′) =

cBG, if s = B and s
′ = G;
cGB, if s = G and s
′ = B;
c0B, if s = 0 and s
′ = B;




These transition costs are estimated without imposing that the length of subscription con-
tracts is known. Consumers are always allowed to switch but, if they have status s, they
3More details in the Appendix.
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pay a cost of choosing s′ 6= s. Consequently, I estimate a cost which is a combination of
monetary sunk subscription costs and any other non-monetary costs that user decisions
may imply. I refer to the combination of these two types of costs as switching costs. These
are sunk costs css′ depending on which subscription s ∈ {0, B,G} the individual held at the
time of the service change to s′. Moreover, the cost of termination - choosing absence of
subscription (s′ = 0) - is always assumed to be zero for the identification reasons discussed
in the next section.
2.2.2 Demand Identification: Revealed Preference
I first discuss the identification of utility parameters θ. I show there is a set of revealed
preference relations that generate moments for these parameters which are identical to a
setting such as Katz (2007)’s. I then derive the set of moments I use to estimate continuation
values and subscription costs.
Identification of Utility Parameters
Suppose a consumer receives a decision shock in period t. They then choose (b, j) to
solve equation (2.1). If the separability assumption A1 holds true, we can compare the
utility value associated with each alternative retailer k 6= j such that k, j ∈ Js′ holding the
subscription and bundle chosen fixed. By holding the bundle fixed, the difference in utility
across retailers is independent of the bundle chosen, reducing the set of parameters to be
estimated. Moreover, by holding the subscription fixed, costs associated with maintaining
or switching between subscriptions are differenced out along with continuation values. To
see this, let b denote the bundle bought at retailer j and b̃ denote the optimal bundle the
consumer would have bought at an alternative store k.
Let I be the individual’s information set when making such decision. Suppose the state
is s optimally makes a subscription decision s′. The revealed preference relation between
the individual’s choice and their utility when the optimal bundle b̃ associated with the
alternative retailer choice k is:
E[ubj − css′ + βEV (s′, ε′)|I] ≥ E[ub̃k − css′ + βEV (s
′, ε′)|I], ∀k ∈ Js′ . (2.5)
Additionally, if b̃ is the optimal bundle choice at store k then, for any other bundle -
including b - the following inequality also holds true:
E[ub̃j − css′ + βEV (s
′, ε′)|I] ≥ E[ubk − css′ + βEV (s′, ε′)|I], ∀k ∈ Js′ . (2.6)
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By transitivity, joining the last two inequalities yields:
E[ubj − css′ + βEV (s′, ε′)|I] ≥ E[ubk − css′ + βEV (s′, ε′)|I], ∀k ∈ Js′ . (2.7)
Note that both sides of this inequality have identical terms with the exception of ubj and
ubk. Consequently, it simplifies to:
E[ujb|I] ≥ E[ukb̃|I] ie, E[∆ubjk|I] ≥ 0. (2.8)
This last inequality is the key implication of consumer behavior used for estimation. It
implies that, for any purchase (b, j), we can hold the bundle b and the subscription s′ fixed
and compare the utility of this observed choice with the utility of the alternative choice
(b, k) as long as k is also a retailer available in Js′ . Re-arranging this result and using the
specification from equation (2.1) we get:
E[∆ub,jk|I] = E[(−1 + αY )∆Pbjk + ∆Xjk(β0 + Z1β1) + ∆Tjk(γ0 + η)|I] ≥ 0. (2.9)
Note that, not only are subscription costs and continuation values differenced out but, so
are both terms associated with the bundle utility: Vb, the mean bundle utility and εb, the
unobserved bundle shock. As as result, we have a set of inequalities that depends only on
retailer choice utility parameters.
The measured moments that are used to estimate the vector of parameters θ of the utility
are:
∆ũb,jk(s; θ) = (−1 + αY )∆P̃bjk + ∆X̃jk(β0 + Z̃1β1) + ∆T̃jk(γ0 + η) ≥ 0, (2.10)
ε is a structural error and ignoring this type of error can cause important bias4. Differencing
out this term implies that these moments are valid regardless of the characteristics of this
random variable which avoids problems with making additional specification assumptions.
The term η is source of unobserved heterogeneity known to the consumer that can also be
a source of bias if ignored. This term is addressed with a normalization with respect to the
traveled distance for the trip (when it’s offline). Details of this normalization can be found
in Katz (2007). Another type of error that can arise in this setting is measurement error5.
This includes expectational errors and other examples discussed next.
Measurement errors enter naturally in the model. This is the case for the expectational error
that would arise if the incorrect bundle is used to measure equation (2.10). If the consumer
4This corresponds to the class of errors labeled as ν2 in Pakes et al. (2015).
5ν1 in Pakes et al. (2015).
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based their purchase decision on bundle b′ instead of b, an error of this sort would correspond
to the difference between the expenditure for these two bundles: ν1 = ∆Pbjk −E[∆Pb′jk|I].
It should then be the case that E[ν1|I] = 0 and, consequently,
E[∆ũbjk|W ] = E[∆ubjk|W ] = E[∆ub′jk|I] + E[ν1|I] = E[∆ub′jk|I] ≥ 0, (2.11)
Where ũbjk is the difference in utility measured and W are the instruments used for the
consumer’s information set6. Further details on this type of expectational error can be
found in Katz (2007).
Since current prices are observed in the data, the inequality (2.9) is measured directly from
the data for a set of alternative retailers k that are good comparisons to choice j. For every
purchase in the data, the counterfactual cost of the bundle purchased is constructed for
every retailer chain available in the metro area of that trip and every online retailer option
in the data. This is done by using the prices paid for the same UPCs in the bundle by other
consumers in other stores. In that way, a mean price is calculated for every UPC at all the
retailers where that product is available. Then, for each bundle purchased, the mean prices
are used to compute the alternative bundle cost at every retailer. The universe of retailers
in the data is the set of retailers that were visited at least once by a Nielsen panelist in the
2015-2017 period. For each trip, alternative retailers will be the two closest retailers and
the two retailers with most similar cost, resulting in a total of 4 inequalities per observation.
Although these moments recover θ without dealing with the computation of future values,
they do not identify fixed and sunk costs as those parameters are differenced out in relation
(2.9). For this reason, I discuss next how I use a second set of revealed preference relations
to estimate these costs.
Identification of Subscription Costs
In order to recover fixed and sunk costs, I present a second set of revealed preference relations
relative to the subscription choice. Further, I show how to use rationality constraints on
future switching behavior to impose bounds on differential continuation values to evaluate
the set of moment inequalities resulting from the revealed preference relations presented
next.
Define the choice specific value function, conditional on s′:
v(s, s′, ε) = us′(ε)− css′ + βE[V (s′, ε′)|s′]. (2.12)
By optimality, if the consumer chooses s′ conditionally on state s:
6See Hansen and Singleton (1982) for details on the instrumentation in rational expectation models using
sample counterparts to the population orthogonality conditions.
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E[v(s, s′, ε)|I] ≥ E[v(s, s̃, ε)|I], ∀ s̃ ∈ S. (2.13)
Joining the last two inequalities yields:
E[us′(ε)− css′ + βE[V (s′, ε′)|s′] |I] ≥ E[us̃′(ε)− css̃ + βE[V (s̃, ε′)|s̃] |I],
⇔
E[∆ub,jk − css′ + css̃ + β(E[V (s′, ε′)|s′]− E[V (s̃, ε′)|s̃] |I]) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Js̃. (2.14)
Under the standard assumption that the random utility component is i.i.d over time, we
get:
E∆Vs′s̃′ = ∆EVs′s̃′ ≡ E[V (s′, ε′)]− E[V (s̃′, ε′)]. (2.15)
The inequality (2.14) should then hold conditionally on the bundle and retailer (j) chosen
by i, similarly to (2.9). It then yields:
E[∆ub,jk − css′ + css̃ + βE∆Vs′s̃|I] ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Js̃. (2.16)
Using (2.10), the inequality above is measured as:
(−1 + αY )∆P̃bjk + ∆X̃jk(β0 + Z̃1β1) + ∆T̃jk(γ0 + Z̃2γ1 + η)
−Fs′ − css′ + Fs̃′ + css̃′ + βE∆Ṽs′s̃′ ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Js̃′ . (2.17)
In order to compute this second set of moments for a candidate {θ̂, F̂, ĉ}, we need to compute
the term E∆Ṽs′s̃′ . So, I use rational switching conditions to impose bounds on these value
differences. The estimation proceeds in two steps. I first estimate the utility parameters (θ)
using solely the first set of moments, following Pakes et al. (2015) and Katz (2007). Secondly,
I use these estimated parameters and rationality constraints to compute the differences
in continuation value across alternatives. Details of the procedure to bound differential
future values and estimate switching costs in presented in the Appendix. The second set
of moments is then evaluated to estimate switching costs. Chapter (3) presents demand
estimation results.
Next, I present the entry game played by Big Tech and Grocer Partner. For the purpose
of the entry game, the demand model is used to generate a law of motion of subscribers -
the state variable for firms governing the evolution of revenues. Details on how I use the
demand model to build the law of motion of subscribers are presented in the second part
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of next chapter. Using the game setup presented next, I estimate they key parameters of
firm costs to conduct counterfactuals relying on dynamics induced by both consumer lock-in
(demand) and cost structure.
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Chapter 3
The Entry Game: How Grocery
Delivery Platforms Compete
3.1 Introduction
The online grocery market has grown significantly over the last five years as large brick-and-
mortar retailers such as Walmart and Target have made large investments, and new digital
platforms such as Instacart, Google Express, Prime Now and Amazon Fresh have engaged
in significant entry across the United States. In June 2017, a major online retailer already
engaged in online grocery operations acquired a national grocery chain. This firm’s increased
distribution capabilities posed an important threat to rivals contemplating online grocery
investment1. Moreover, the merger gave the online retailer immediate access to many
potential customers. On the one hand, as online delivery services rely on subscriptions and
may be subject to switching costs, this generates concerns about future exertion of market
power2. On the other hand, costs to deliver grocery products increase with distance which
constrains the effects of this firm’s scale across markets and makes the firm’s dominance
contestable by rivals. In this case, the strategic response by competitors to the acquisition
can be important for the overall welfare impact on consumers.
First, this paper provides a framework to study how grocery delivery platforms such as
Amazon Prime Now and Instacart make strategic entry decisions considering both the in-
centive to lock in consumers with subscriptions before their rival and costs of operating
in different geographical markets. I study the entry timing decisions of two large plat-
forms with differences in business models affecting their costs and entry strategies. Due
1See Scott-Morton et al. (2019) for a more general outline of entry barriers associated with digital
platforms.
2For more considerations about market power in similar contexts see Zingales and Lancieri (2019) and
Khan (2017)
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to the proprietary nature of the data, I refer to the firms studied by names that allude to
their business models: Big Tech is the large online retailer and its main delivery platform
competitor is Grocer Partner. Both firms have very large population coverage across the
United States and have grown significantly over the last five years. Grocer Partner sources
products from local grocery store partners which allows it to enter markets faster than
Big Tech, who builds new fulfillment centers dedicated to grocery delivery in each market.
Both firms chase a first-mover advantage as a result of consumer switching costs associated
with subscriptions. So, even though Grocer Partner can enter markets faster, Big Tech’s
investments in distribution facilities can pay off in the future if the firm grows its customer
base enough to benefit from returns to scale in each market.
The second goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare impact of mergers when entry
timing is crucial to competition. I evaluate to types of mergers which have opposite effects
on consumer welfare. The first is an actual merger which took place in 2017 between Big
Tech and a national grocery chain. I show that an important aspect of the welfare impact
of this acquisition was Grocer Partner ’s strategic entry response. When met with the
competitive threat presented by the merger, Grocer Partner ’s own intent to build a loyal
customer base increases this firm’s incentive to chase a first-mover advantage by entering
new geographical markets earlier. Moreover, because competition in the grocery market is
limited by geographical proximity, Big Tech’s increased scale provided by the acquisition
had limited effects on the rival’s ability to compete, contributing to the rival’s response.
Conversely, a potential horizontal merger between Big Tech and Grocer Partner would
result in a slowdown of entry. The merged firm would not have an incentive to serve
markets early due to the lack of competitive threat. I use these mergers to show the welfare
effect of competition in the timing of entry in a market where firms chase a first-mover
advantage.
I study firms’ strategic entry timing decisions in the face of switching costs. The model is a
dynamic entry game and shares many similarities with store location and entry models, such
as Arcidiacono et al. (2016) and Holmes (2011). In particular, there are similarities with
models of strategic spatial preemption such as Zheng (2016) and Igami and Yang (2016),
where the timing of access to a particular market determines firm payoffs. However, in such
models, once a location is captured by one player, it is removed from the rival’s choice set. In
my setting, not only firms can serve the same areas as their competitor, but customers can
switch between them over time. Since switching can be costly to consumers, the second firm
to enter a market will accumulate customers less quickly. Firms then compete in continuous
time across independent markets and receive random opportunities to make entry decisions,
such as in Arcidiacono et al. (2016). I introduce two important features to the model which
allow me to study the role of the incentive to build a customer base to firms’ entry decisions.
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I use the estimated demand model to construct the law of motion of firm revenues using
consumers’ conditional choice probability of switching between subscription services over
time. I also allow firms’ entry cost to vary over time and estimate the rate of change
using the entry model to rationalize the firms’ increase in entry frequency over time. This
feature, present in models of technology adoption such as Schmidt-Dengler (2006), captures
the platforms’ entry timing trade-off between first-mover advantage and costs.
I use this empirical framework to conduct a retrospective analysis of the recent acquisition
between Big Tech and the national grocery chain. I find that the acquisition significantly
increased both firms’ speed of entry across new markets, giving consumers earlier access
to the services and generating important welfare gains in the short run. Specifically, had
the acquisition not happened, both firms would have entered new markets over two years
later, on average. The combined costs associated with the two firms’ earlier entry due
to the acquisition amount to a loss of $624 M in producer surplus. However, consumer
benefits across markets that were served earlier due to this merger are larger, representing
a total welfare gain of $846 M. Additionally, the fact that this merger allowed the large
online retailer to enter multiple markets earlier provides an explanation for the premium
paid for the acquisition3. Moreover, until this merger occurred, this retail chain was Grocer
Partner ’s largest affiliated retailer, giving it access to approximately 23 million consumers4.
This supports the fact that Grocer Partner anticipated how the acquisition would affect its
ability to serve certain markets and reacted through earlier entry.
I perform a second counterfactual that simulates a potential horizontal merger between Big
Tech and Grocer Partner resulting in a monopoly. I find that, due to the lack of significant
competitive threat, the monopolist would not have an incentive to serve markets early. I
also show that consumer losses due to delayed entry by the monopolist are larger than cost
savings from this merger. In both analysis, the focus is on entry timing and firms do not
choose prices in the model. For this reason, this paper is limited in its ability to capture
possible future harm to consumers through prices. However, I use the demand model to
show how consumers’ substitution patterns as response to price changes and I find evidence
that competition is important. Even though switching costs contribute to the firms’ ability
to raise prices, this ability is significantly reduced when consumers have more than one
service alternative.
This paper relates to the literature measuring the importance of entry timing to firm deci-
sions. In my setting, the source of early entry incentives is explicitly present in the demand
model. I model the mechanism driving consumers’ inertia and its relationship with firms’
strategic behavior.
3https://mercercapital.com/financialreportingblog/amazon-whole-foods-and-value-implications/
4Combined population of the zip codes that had access to delivery from these stores.
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3.2 Entry Game
I observe both firms’ entry decisions at the time they announce the service is launching in a
new location. The time between decisions are then not fixed (e.g. annual or quarterly) and
decisions are observed in continuous time. Moreover, features of both firms’ distribution
costs and revenues suggest that markets are independent. Indeed, Big Tech’s operation
of same-day grocery delivery is done through a separate online platform created for this
purpose. The fulfillment centers used for this service are also separate from its other online
retail operations. Each market gets a dedicated hub built exclusively for this type of deliv-
ery. This makes sense given that grocery and fast delivery require products to be shipped
locally, unlike other product categories. For Grocer Partner, deliveries are fulfilled from
local partner stores. Even though the platform partners with chains that have national
presence, the decision of which stores are used has only local implications and restrictions.
These features motivate the choice of the model that follows.
Two firms i ∈ {B,G} make strategic entry decisions within each independent market m ∈
{1, 2, ...,M}. Time is continuous and two independent Poisson processes with parameter
λi, i ∈ {B,G}, govern decision opportunities for each firm in a market. When facing an
entry opportunity, the firm observes an exogenous state Bi ∈ {0, 1}M which indicates in
which market the firm can choose to make an entry decision. The firm also observes the
distribution of subscribers in the market which indicates whether their rival is present and
how many customers have already been locked-in: Nm.
For each move arrival in m, the Big Tech firm (B) can choose to enter (j = 1) if it wasn’t
already serving m and makes no further choices otherwise. Ie, the firm chooses j ∈ {0, 1}
if NBm = 0. Given a chance to move, the Grocer Partner (G) firm can choose to enter
(j = 1) if it wasn’t already serving the market (NGm = 0) and expand coverage (j = 2) if it
already had market presence (NGm > 0). Neither firm can exit markets served. The stock
of subscribers Nim in each market determines the firms’ flow revenues:
Ri(Nm) = r̄iNim, i = B,G, (3.1)
Where r̄i is i’s average revenue per customer, including subscription fees and consumers’
purchase expenditures. When B enters market m, it needs to build a fulfillment center
(FC). The size of the FC can differ across markets and is a measure of the firm’s scale
in each location: FBm. Operating a larger FC can imply larger fixed costs and the firm’s
flow profit parameter βB1 captures this effect. Firm G needs partnerships in each market
in order to operate and expand. This firm’s number of partners in each market increases
over time along with its coverage. The number of partners FGm can affect the firm’s fixed
and variable cost of delivery through parameters βG1 and βG2, respectively. Finally, the
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market’s population density affects each firm’s variable costs through βB2 and βG3.
Firm B’s flow profits in market m are then:
πBm = 1zBm=1[r̄BNBm + βB0 + βB1FBm + βB2dm + βB3h]. (3.2)
Firm G’s flow profits in market m are:
πGm = 1zGm>0[(r̄G − βG2FGm)NGm + βG0 + βG1FGm + βG3dm + βG4h], (3.3)
Where h is an unobserved market state. Each firm also pays a sunk cost to enter which I
allow to vary over time to capture firms’ ability to expand at lower costs after entering many
markets and to rationalize the increase in the frequency of entry for both firms observed in
the data. Choice-specific sunk payoffs for B are then:
ψB =
κB0 + κB1h+ κB2t, if j = 1 & NBm = 0,0 otherwise.
Firm G also pays an expansion cost which can differ from the entry cost. Entry costs for
this firm are then:
ψG =

κG0 + κG1h+ κG2t, if j = 1 & NGm = 0,
ηG0 + ηG1h+ ηG2t, if j = 1 & NGm > 0,
0 otherwise.
Law of Motion of Subscribers
The inequalities from the demand model imply subscription decisions for each consumer
given a bundle choice. Evaluating these decisions for each of the three possible service
availability cases (B alone, G alone and both B and G in the market) for a sample of
consumers generates frequencies of subscription choices, conditional on each state. These
frequencies are estimates for transition probabilities that represent the law of motion of sub-
scribers in a market for each service availability case. Let m be a market where consumers
have characteristics Xm. The transition matrix M(Xm) describes the aggregate transition
across subscription states of consumers in m. Nm describes distribution of subscribers in
m across {0, B,G}. Hence, the stock of subscribers evolves according to:
Ṅm = M(Xm)Nm. (3.4)
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MB(Xm), if zGm = 0
MG(Xm), if zBm = 0
MBG(Xm), if zim > 0,∀i
I3, otherwise.
Where zim, i = {B,G} is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i’s service is available in m.
Nim for each firm is independent of characteristics of any other market. Firm costs in
each market are independent of distribution centers and retail partners in other locations.
Indeed, availability of both services is determined by the consumer’s zip code and is highly
correlated with the distance to the local FC (for B) and closest partner stores (for G).
Consequently, assuming that markets are separable and firm entry decisions are made at
the market level is appropriate. This implies that the exogenous state determining in which
market the firm can make an entry decision, given an opportunity to move, can be expressed
at the market level: Bim. Following the value function formulation in Arcidiacono et al.




j∈{0,1} q−iσ−ijkVi,`(−i,j,k) + λiqiE{Vi,`(i,j,k) + ψijk + εijk}
ρ+ +q−iλ−iσ−ijk + qiλi
, (3.5)
Where qi is the probability that Bim = 1. Section (3.3-3.3.2) presents the estimation steps
and profit estimation results.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Demand Estimation Results and Substitution Patterns
The estimates for the revealed preference model are presented in tables (B.34) to (B.36).
The first table shows the results for the parameters where I interact each firm fixed-effect
with household characteristics. All parameter estimates are in dollars per shopping trip and,
the estimates of the interactions between demographic variables and each firm’s fixed-effect
can be directly interpreted as differences in consumer surplus after normalizing by the cost
elasticity for that group5.
The parameter results show the different channels through which consumers benefit form




these online retail alternatives. An important dimension for benefits generated for con-
sumers is the distance to offline alternatives and variety of offline alternatives in the con-
sumer’s vicinity. The travel cost is one channel that affects this value: the more distant the
consumer is to brick-and-mortar retailers, the higher their cost to choose an offline retailer
and the more attractive is the online service. With a travel cost of $0.55/ mile and an aver-
age distance traveled to a grocery store of 7.97 miles, consumers incur on average an utility
loss due to travel costs of approximately $4.38 per shopping trip. The variety of alternatives
within 1 and 5 miles also affects the benefits that consumers get from the online services.
An additional retailer within 1 mile makes Big Tech and Grocer Partner less valuable by
$0.36 and $0.44, respectively. Between 1 and 5 miles the effect for Big Tech’s service is much
smaller (a negative effect of $0.04) and, the effect for Grocer Partner ’s service is positive:
an additional retailer between 1 and 5 miles increases the value of this service by $0.26 per
shopping trip. This is due to the fact that this service requires local stores to operate and,
the more stores are located closely to a zip code the more partnerships Grocer Partner will
offer and the more value this service will generate to consumers.
In order to disentangle the effect from Grocer Partner ’s increased quality due to proximity
to partner stores and the substitution effect of offering the service in an area that already has
a variety of brick-and-mortar options, in column (2) I add the number of partners offered by
Grocer Partner and the distance between the consumer and the closest store. New online
services are more valuable to consumers who live further from the closest store (grocery,
drug store or discount store). In the specification with ν2, I find that Big Tech and Grocer
Partner ’s services are $0.46 and $0.34 more valuable per shopping trip, respectively, per mile
of distance between the consumer and the closest store. An additional partnership offered
to the consumer makes the Grocer Partner ’s service worth $1.44 more per shopping trip.
This specification allows me to calculate the value associated with this complementarity
between this service and its partners and discuss how it affects consumers differently due
to their geographic living location. Zip codes with an average income of up to 45K that
are served by Grocer Partner have on average 7.21 partners offering delivery whereas zip
codes with average income of more than 70K have 10.96. This is a difference of 34% on the
quality of Grocer Partner across these two income groups due to differences in pre-existing
availability of offline retail. Low income households then miss out on approximately $5.25
per shopping trip of welfare relative to high income households due to complementarity
between Grocer Partner and the nearby offline retailers. Since users of delivery services
make approximately 10.21 purchases per year, low income households could benefit over
$50/year more from Grocer Partner if they lived in zip codes with an average income of
more than 70K. On the other hand, since low income households live at a further distance
from stores they benefit more form online services through the substitution channel. On
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average, a low income zip code in the sample is on average 6.88 miles from the closest store
whereas a a high income one is at 5.44 miles. Since each mile contributes $0.34 per trip
to the value of Grocer Partner ’s service and $0.49 to the value to of Big Tech, low income
households can benefit up to 26.4% more per purchase from these services through this
channel. An average low income zip code then benefits approximately up to $21.52 per year
from having access to a delivery service exclusively due to distance to brick-and-mortar
stores.
Other demographic characteristics that matter for welfare are age and gender (table (B.34)).
Households where either the female or the male head are under 30 years old value online
delivery between $1.66 and $3.09 more than households where one of the heads is older
(depending on the service and the specification). Households of single females also value
the services slightly more than other types of family: up to $0.54 more for Big Tech and up
to $0.79 for Grocer Partner per shopping trip.
I conduct a counterfactual to measure how responsive consumers are to a change in the value
of each subscription. The goal is to measure how much, in the presence of subscription lock-
in, firms can raise prices in the long run. I compute these subscription elasticities for each
service in two scenarios: when the consumer can choose to switch to the competitor and
when there is no competition. I conduct a counterfactual where I decrease the subscription
value by −$20 simulating an increase in the subscription fee by the same amount or an
equivalent change in prices of goods sold through each platform. I find that consumers have
a similar response to such a change in the value of the Big Tech subscription compared
to Grocer Partner in the case where both alternatives are available. In this case, 50% of
subscribers would switch from Big Tech to Grocer Partner if Big Tech had a price increase
of this magnitude. 46% would switch from Grocer Partner to Big Tech if Grocer Partner
were the firm increasing prices. In the absence of the rival, switching patterns are very
similar for Grocer Partner but quite different for Big Tech. When the rival is not available
to the consumer, only 36% of subscribers would switch away from Big Tech’s service whereas
45% would switch away from Grocer Partner. This shows that the latter is a much closer
substitute to other available alternatives such as brick-and-mortar grocers. This makes
sense, given that this firm offers delivery from stores that are located close to the consumer.
An important implication of these results is that, having another platform competing with
Big Tech is important for keeping prices low in the long run.
3.3.2 Estimation of Profit Parameters and Results
The estimation takes place in two steps. First, I estimate reduced-form entry hazards for
each firm using a logit with parameters varying by firm:
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Where φ(k, z, α) is a linear function of state variables and z the market’s unobserved state.
The specification estimated is:
φi(k, z, α) = αi1 + α
i
2 ∗ popm + αi3 ∗ pop2m + αi4 ∗ incomem + αi5 ∗ t+ αi6 ∗ FGm + αi7 ∗N−im.
Let h(α) = (λBσB(k, z, α), λGσG(k, z, α))) be the choice hazards. In a second step, the profit
structural parameters (θ) are estimated. The value function is expressed as a function of the
structural parameters and the first-stage hazards h(α̂). The hazards are used to solve for
the value function using Proposition 4 in Arcidiacono et al. (2016) and generate structural
hazards Λ(θ, ĥ). The second-step pseudo-likelihood then uses the structural hazards to
estimate θ̂ using Maximum Likelihood.
Tables (B.38) and (B.39) show the estimates for the firms’ profit parameters. The first
important difference between firms is captured by entry costs. Entry cost at time 0 for Big
Tech is approximately the equivalent to 1 year of the average market’s variable profits. The
entry cost at time 0 for Grocer Partner is only 8% of the average market’s yearly variable
profits for this firm. This explains why Grocer Partner enters faster across markets and its
pattern of entering markets by steps with progressive expansions across pockets of zip codes.
Another key difference in cost structures captured by model parameters is in scale economies
and the importance of population density to lower unit distribution costs. Whereas Big Tech
has large fixed costs which increase with the size of its distribution center in a particular
market, Grocer Partner does not. Fixed costs for the latter are estimated using the number
of partnerships by market, which estimates show have more important effect on revenues
than costs. On the other hand, Big Tech’s distribution costs fall with population density
at a much faster pace than Grocer Partner ’s. This is consistent with the fact that Big Tech
basically stopped expanding across new markets using same-day grocery fulfillment centers
after entering the largest (and densest) markets in the U.S and after acquiring stores that
could be used as distribution hubs instead. Figure (B.13) shows the growth in population
coverage of the two firms and Big Tech’s shift towards expansion with stores after the
acquisition. Conversely, Grocer Partner continues to expand across smaller and sparser




The first counterfactual exercise measures the importance of early entry to firms’ entry
decisions. I use an approach similar to Schmidt-Dengler (2006)’s to measure preemption.
I compute a Nash Equilibrium where firms pre-commit to their entry times, removing the
incentive to for early entry6. Each firm then chooses entry strategies consistent with the
belief that their rival commits to the pre-commitment equilibrium. Table (B.40) shows the
average time in years since the beginning of the game (June 2012) it takes each firm to enter
markets in the sample. Entry decisions generated by the model with early entry incentives
are such that Big Tech enters markets on average after 3.55 years and Grocer Partner after
3.97, considering expansion decisions. In the counterfactual with commitment, it takes Big
Tech on average 4.68 years to enter a market and 5.20 years for Grocer Partner. Entering
earlier means higher entry costs but potentially higher variable flow profits due to subscriber
accumulation and rival deterrence. I compute payoffs for each firm in each equilibrium across
markets to measure producer surplus losses due to early entry. Losses for Grocer Partner
are the highest, amounting to 31.34% of its average payoff. As shown in table B.39, this
firm’s entry cost decrease over time at a much faster rate than Big Tech’s. This effect is
identified by the increasing rate with which the firms enter markets over time. And it drives
high relative losses of early entry for this firm. Early entry also implies important losses for
Big Tech. On average, this firm gives up 10.84% of its payoff in each market due to early
entry - table (B.41).
The second exercise measures the effects of a merger between Big Tech and a grocery chain.
The acquisition allows the firm to enter markets faster because the stores bought can be
immediately used in the grocery delivery operation. This allows the firm to partially forgo
during the period following the acquisition (2018-2019) the entry cost that exists in the
model. The entry timing for the post-merger period is observed in the data for two years. I
compare these observed decisions with the timing predicted by the estimated pre-acquisition
model for those markets (out of sample). In the model, the firm pays a high entry cost (table
B.39) to enter these new markets. In particular, for Big Tech, entry costs are as high as one
year of variable profits. With the acquisition, this firm can enter faster by reducing these
costs in each market thanks to the use of stores already in place. This explains the faster
rate with which it expands during the period following the merger seen in figures (B.15) and
(B.13). Comparing the model with the data, I find that the firm gains on average 2.51 years
in speed of entry across new markets, as shown in table (B.42). The result is similar for the
competitor, who enters 2.41 years faster as a result. The rationale for the faster entry of
6This approach yields very similar results to one where switching costs are removed and consumers’
transition (and revenues) is as table (B.37) on the right.
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Grocer Partner in the data compared to the model is that the merger raised the stakes on
entry for this firm as well. The firm responds to the rival’s faster entry potential due to the
acquisition by accelerating its own entry decisions to take advantage of consumer lock-in.
Table (B.43) shows the effect of this merger on consumer welfare and how much the earlier
entry induced by it represents in terms of producer surplus. Consumers gain a total of $846
in welfare over the time period in which they get earlier access to the new services as a result
of this acquisition. This represents the effect of competition in entry timing on consumer
welfare. This number surpasses the losses to firms due to the accelerated entry. I find that
the earlier entry induced by the acquisition costs $624 to the two platforms. I compute this
using Big tech’s pre-acquisition cost structure to infer the value of this acquisition for this
firm in terms of entry timing as well as the cost it imposes on the competitor, providing a
measure that rationalizes the high price paid for the grocery chain.
The third exercise analyses the consequences of a merger between Big Tech and Grocer
Partner. The merged firm is a monopolist whose base of subscribers (ÑM ) is the sum of
subscribers to both services: ÑM = NB + NG. Due to the absence of competition, choice
hazards do not include the other firm’s customer base accumulated in the market. In each
market, the monopolist’s cost is the minimum between making use of the FC network or the
set of partners. In other words, the monopolist chooses the business model in each market
that yields the highest payoff. In a more sophisticated setup, the monopolist’s business
model could be hybrid and the firm would be able to choose what version of the service to
offer to different zip codes. This is probably relevant for consumer welfare if the value of
each service differs across locations in the same market. I focus for now on the entry timing
effect which shouldn’t be affected by the possibility of a hybrid business model. Results
for this counterfactual are presented in table (B.44). The results show that, in the absence
of the threat from a competitor to generate a barrier to future entry through lock-in, the
firm does not have an incentive to enter markets earlier. This shows the role of competition
in promoting entry of new products across markets. Indeed, I find that consumers would
lose $ 2.04 Billion in welfare across the geographical markets that eventually were served
exclusively due to delayed entry by the monopolist. That does not include the effects of
possible future price increases by the monopolist. Indeed, as discussed in the demand results
section, the Big Tech service is not a close substitute to existing alternatives. Consequently,
in the markets where the monopolist chooses this cost structure there would be an incentive
to increase prices in the future as consumers as less likely to unsubscribe as a response to
a price increase. Finally, table (B.44) also shows the proportion of markets where the
monopolist would choose each business model. Big Tech makes use of large fixed costs
and has also larger economies of density, as its distribution cost is more strongly reduced
with population density. In only approximately 20% of markets served this would be the
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most efficient cost structure. In the other 80%, Grocer Partner ’s model of decentralized
distribution is the most profitable choice.
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Conclusion
This dissertation provides an empirical framework to study the relationship between strate-
gic entry timing and consumer welfare in a setting where consumer lock-in is a driving
force of entry. I study the entry timing decisions of two firms with distinct business mod-
els. Differences between business models allow me to distinguish entry incentives driven
by cost structure from consumer lock-in. I do so by using data on two platforms offering
grocery delivery in a variety of U.S. markets. The model is a useful setup for both demand
a supply-related questions relevant for current antitrust policy discussions around digital
platforms in markets where geography also affects costs and competition. First, I measure
the importance of consumer lock-in due to switching costs associated with subscriptions, a
pricing strategy widely used in e-commerce and other platform-enabled markets. Second,
I model the relationship between demand dynamics and supply timing decisions in an em-
pirically tractable way. Then, by relating these two sides, I measure the importance of the
demand mechanism as well as costs to firms’ entry strategies.
Results show that sunk costs associated with subscriptions generate significant inertia in
platform choice. In absence of switching costs, consumers would switch ten times more often
across services. This inertia in customer base makes firms’ decision to enter markets time-
sensitive, as entering late comes with the cost of having to breach the barrier of consumer
lock-in created by the rival. On the other hand, entering early implies higher entry costs
and the efficiency loss associated with this incentive is, on average, 10% of producer surplus
for the firm with high fixed costs and 30% of producer surplus for the firm with high variable
costs.
I use the model to evaluate the impact of two types of mergers on consumer welfare and
efficiency. Each merger has very different implications for each of these outcomes, showing
that timing of entry is an important dimension to be considered in merger and welfare
analysis in markets being gradually created by geographical entry. The first is the acquisition
of a grocery chain by Big Tech. This merger reduced the entry cost of a firm for which
this was the main entry barrier. This allowed the firm to enter markets much quicker
following the acquisition. In contrast, the rival with low entry costs responded to the
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acquisition by increasing the pace of its own entry decisions immediately after the acquisition
announcement by Big tech. In the model, this is captured by the rival’s expectation that Big
Tech will establish consumer lock-in by accumulating subscribers in new markets faster than
before. This then increases the payoff of early entry for Grocer Partner. As a consequence,
many markets that would only receive one or both services over 8 years after the first
platform is created get them more than 2 years earlier. Even though this merger may have
other consequences that are important for competition and consumer welfare which are not
within the scope of this dissertation, it fostered consumer welfare through strategic entry
timing.
Conversely, a merger that establishes a monopoly in the delivery market has the opposite
effect. If Big Tech decides to buy off Grocer Partner, the consequence predicted is a signif-
icant slow down in entry speed. In particular, if this merger had occurred at the beginning
of the entry game, consumers would have gained access to these technologies at least 6
years later, on average. Again, this is without considering any dimension for which market
structure would also be relevant for, including the incentive to create these services in the
first place. Finally, this framework can be used to analyze many other markets that blend
digital technology and offline cost structures that are under the antitrust scrutiny today.
Indeed, timing of access to particular geographical markets is a crucial factor to a firm’s
decision to buy another business. And, more importantly, the way competitors are expected
to react, given features of the market, is an important factor to consider when analyzing
whether the acquisition is harmful to consumers of not.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Appendix II - Estimation of Switching Costs
A.1.1 Deriving the System of Differential Values
In order to estimate the switching costs, I will compare the consumer’s optimal subscription
action to an alternative choice that could have been taken. This will generate a set of
inequalities that will then be used as moments for estimation. The idea is the same as the
one used to estimate the set of parameters θ̂ in the static portion of the utility. However, to
estimate the switching costs wee need an approximation of the continuation value of each
subscription action for each trip in the data. For example, I want to be able to compute:
∆uBG − FB + FG + cBG + β[EV (B, ε′)− EV (G, ε′)] ≥ 0. (A.1)
This inequality means that, if a trip t for consumer i is observed in the data such that
the state in that period for i is B and the consumer chooses S′ = B then, the difference
between the choice specific value of B and the choice specific value of G needs to satisfy
the revealed preference relation (A.1). Next, I will show how to approximate E∆VBG(ε′) =
EV (B, ε′)−EV (G, ε′) to compute that inequality for a set of parameters using this example.
E∆VBG(ε′) = EV (B, ε′)− EV (G, ε′)
= E[V (B, ε′)− V (G, ε′)
= E[max{uB(ε′)− FB + βEV (B, ε′′);uG(, ε′)− FG − cBG + βEV (G, ε′′);u0(ε′) + βEV (0, ε′′)}
− max{uB(ε′)− FB − cGB + βEV (B, ε′′);uG(ε′)− FG + βEV (G, ε′′);u0(ε′) + βEV (0, ε′′)}]
= E[max{cGB ; ∆uBG − FB + FG + βE∆VBG; ∆uB0 − FB + βE∆VB0;
∆uGB − FG + FB − cBG + cGB + βE∆VGB ;−cBG; ∆uG0 − FG − cBG + βE∆VG0;
∆u0B + FB + cGB + βE∆V0B ; ∆u0G + FG + βE∆V0G; 0}, (A.2)
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Where
ΩBB,GB = {ε ∈ Ωε|B = argmaxa∈SVa(B, ε) ∧B = argmaxa∈SVa(G, ε)}.
Hence,
E∆VBG(ε′) = P (BB,GB)[cGB ] + P (BB,GG)[E[∆uBG|ΩBB,GB ]− FB + FG + βE∆VBG] +
P (BB,G0)[E[∆uB0|ΩBB,G0]− FB + βE∆VB0] + P (BG,GB)[E[∆uGB |ΩBG,GB ]−
FG + FB − cBG + cGB + βE∆VGB ] + P (BG,GG)[−cBG] + P (BG,G0)[E[∆uG0|ΩBG,G0]−
FG − cBG + βE∆VG0] + P (B0, GB)[E[∆u0B |ΩB0,GB ] + FB + cGB + βE∆V0B ] +
P (B0, GG)[E[∆u0G|ΩB0,GG] + FG + βE∆V0G] + P (B0, G0)[0]. (A.3)
Where P (S1a1, S2a2) is the probability of ε
′ being in the set ΩS1a1,S2a2 such that, ∀ε′ ∈
ΩS1a1,S2a2 , if state S1, action a1 is taken and, if state S2 occurs, action a2 is taken. Note
that this set can differ for each consumer because uiS can differ across consumers, for any S.
So, we are integrating over ε′ in a way that is feasible because the number of subscription
actions and states is small. Moreover, consumers’ history of actions is observed in the data
so that these probabilities can be approximated by frequencies in the data. But, even with
a lot of data, it would be hard to observe the same consumer enough times in different
states, given that most consumers never switch between subscriptions. And, we cannot
observe the same shock to the consumer in different states. So, a couple of things are done
to recover the probabilities above. The first one is to think about the rational implications
of two pairs of actions to see if they are pairs with positive probabilities or not.
Similar expressions to equation (A.3) can be derived for E∆VB0(ε′) and E∆VG0(ε′), noting
that E∆VBG(ε′) = −E∆VGB(ε′) and E∆VB0(ε′) = −E∆V0B(ε′) and so on. So, we have
a system of N1 equations and N unknowns that we can use to solve for the difference in
values across states for an individual. However, this system also contains the unknown
values of current expected differential utilities: E[∆uss′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ]. I use rationality conditions
that have to hold in each case to bound these values and solve the system.
Transition probabilities are estimated non-parametrically from frequencies in the data. For
a given individual, we can calculate Pr(S′ = a|S = s) based on frequencies of actions
conditional on the observed state. However, the probabilities needed to solve the system
of differential values requires a different set of probabilities. They are, nonetheless, related.
For example, the set of shocks that, for a given individual, would rationalize S′ = G|S = B
is a subset of shocks that would rationalize S′ = B|S = B. Hence, Pri(S′ = B|S = B∧S′ =
G|S = B) = Pri(S′ = G|S = B). Additionally, some of these sets of shocks are empty and
therefore, have probability zero.
1If conditional choice probabilities are determined at the individual level then, for each individual, we
have N = 3.
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A.1.2 Bounding Differential Values and Estimation
The system of differential values in (A.1.1) has two types of unknowns: expected differen-
tial utilities, conditional on a subset of values for ε′, and unconditional expected differential
value functions. These unknowns appear in pairs in the system that includes equation
(A.3). For example, the difference between the value of action B when the state is B and
the value of action 0 when the state is G is: E[∆uB0|ΩBB,G0] − FB + βE∆VB0. So, the
difference between the flow utility of action a1 in state S1 and of action a2 in state S2 and
the difference between the future values associated with these two actions appear in pairs.
This happens because the subscription choice in the current period determines the set of
choices in that period and, consequently, the flow utility as well as the state in the next pe-
riod. I propose a method to impose bounds on these pairs of differential utilities and values.
Suppose that when the state is s the consumer chooses s′ and when the state is s̃ the
consumer chooses s̃′. This means that ε ∈ Ωss′,s̃s̃′ and the following have to hold:
E[v(s, s′, ε)− v(s̃, s̃′, ε)] = E[∆us′s̃′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ]− Fs′ + Fs̃′ + βE∆Vs′s̃′ . (A.4)
Then, ∀ŝ 6= s′ ∈ S, the following holds:
E[us′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ]− Fs′ + βEV (s′, ε′) ≥ E[uŝ|Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ]− Fŝ − csŝ + βEV (ŝ, ε′),
(A.5)
Including for the case where ŝ = s̃′. Therefore:
⇒ E[∆us′s̃′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ] + βE∆Vs′s̃′ ≥ Fs′ − Fs̃′ − css̃′ . (A.6)
And, ∀ŝ 6= s̃′ ∈ S, the following also holds:
E[us̃′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ]− Fs̃′ + βEV (s̃′, ε′) ≥ E[uŝ|Ωss,s̃s̃]− Fŝ − csŝ + βEV (ŝ, ε′),
(A.7)
Including for the case where ŝ = s′. Therefore:
⇒ E[∆us̃′s′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ] + βE∆Vs̃′s′ ≥ Fs̃′ − Fs′ − cs̃′s
⇔ E[∆us′s̃′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ] + βE∆Vs′s̃′ ≤ Fs′ − Fs̃′ − cs̃′s. (A.8)
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Inequalities (A.8) and (A.6) then provide upper and lower bounds based on intertemporal
rationality constraints for the unknown values of E[∆us′s̃′ |Ωss′,s̃s̃′ ] + βE∆Vs′s̃′ . I use these
bounds to solve the system with all differential future values such as in equation (A.3).
This gives estimates for each E∆Vss′ which can be used, given a guess for parameters, to
solve the second set of moment inequalities such as equation (A.1). The estimation steps
are summarized below.
1. Compute conditional choice probabilities (CCP) of transitioning between each element
of {0, B,G} between two purchase decisions. For a guess of parameters {(F̂ ′s, ĉss′)}s,s′∈S2 :
2. Use the CCP and the system of equations that result from the moment inequalities to
write the difference in future values recursively.
3. For each combination of differential future values - each pair (s, s′), use the intertemporal
rationality constraints to create bounds for the unknown part of the utility depending only
on parameters.
4. Use step 3 to solve for differential future values using the system in step 2.
5. Use differential values from step 4 to solve for set of the second set of moment inequalities





Figure B.1: Services Take-up
Figure B.2: Big Tech Firm Take-up
Figure B.3: Grocer Partner Firm Take-up
Note: Frequency of Big Tech or Grocer Partner service purchases by number of days from launch
among all online transactions of Nielsen panelists that have used either service in the period of
2015-2016. Panelists making these transactions are spread across 27 metro areas where the launch
of each service has occurred at a different date. Graphs show that the scraped arrival dates match
the timing of when purchases start emerging in the Nielsen data.
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Table B.1: Shopping Trips in Panel
Grocer Partner Not Available Grocer Partner Available Total
Big Tech Not Available 312,158 364,593 676,751
Big Tech Available 369,491 334,907 704,398
Total 681,649 699500 1,381,149
Table B.2: Households in Panel
Grocer Partner Not Available Grocer Partner Available Total
Big Tech Not Available 2,132 2,462 4,594
Big Tech Available 2,477 2,231 4,708
Total 4,609 4,693 9,302
Table B.3: Corresponding Zip Codes in Panel
Grocer Partner Not Available Grocer Partner Available Total
Big Tech Not Available 355 314 669
Big Tech Available 354 326 680
Total 709 640 1349
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Table B.4: Sample Zip Codes Tested
Grocer Partner Not Available Grocer Partner Available Total
Big Tech Not Available 8,913 4,863 13,776
Big Tech Available 354 1,716 2,070
Total 9,267 6,579 15,846
Table B.5: Zip Codes Tested Mean Income
Grocer Partner Not Available Grocer Partner Available Total
Big Tech Not Available 84,033.76 83,927.38 83,971.76
Big Tech Available 73,044.17 88,048.86 82,683.82
Total 75,308.69 87,356.78 82,918.19
Note: Table includes number of observed shopping trips to the 4 channels of interest (Grocery,
Discount Store, Drug Store and Online Shopping) during 2015-2016 for panelists in the 27 metro
areas where there are launches of either Big Tech or Grocer Partner (or both) in one of these two
years. This includes trips before and after the launches. The total number of trips will correspond
to the total number of observations in tables (B.17)-(B.19) across all three income groups. The
corresponding number of households making those trips and zip codes are also presented. The last
two tables contain all zip codes with information on availability status scraped from services’
website. This larger sample of zip codes is used to match income data from the 2012-2016 American
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (ACS) and supplemetary information on the number of retail
establishments by NAICS code come from the Zip Codes Business Patterns (ZBP) 2015.
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Table B.6: Metro Areas Where Panelists Who Are Same-day Delivery Users Are Located











Las Vegas x x
Los Angeles x x
Miami x x
Minneapolis-St. Paul x x
Nashville x







San Antonio x x
San Diego x x
San Francisco x x
Seattle x x
Tampa x
Washington DC x x
Note: Table displays metro areas associated with panelists that use either service (Big Tech or
Grocer Partner) in 2015-2016.
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Table B.7: Shopping Trip Characteristics By Retail Channel
Table B.8: Cost of Bundles Bought ($)
Mean Value Spent Per Trip Std. Dev.
Discount Store 59.20 67.22
Drug Store 29.52 48.79
Grocery 45.82 52.03
Online Shopping 68.41 97.16
Table B.9: Distances Traveled (miles)
Min. Distance Traveled in miles Std. Dev.
Discount Store 8.68 7.54
Drug Store 9.50 7.38
Grocery 7.97 6.75
Table B.10: Number of Product UPCs
Average Nb. of UPCs/Retailer Std. Dev.
Discount Store 49,694.25 32,123.79
Drug Store 7,764.16 5,098.56
Grocery 22,625.52 17,064.89
Online Shopping 1,317.12 1,220.10
Note: Each observation is a shopping trip to the relevant channels in the data during 2015-2016 in
the 27 metro areas used. Table (B.8) presents the mean dollar value of the bundles purchased in
trips associated with each channel. Table (B.9) presents the mean distance between panelists and
the closest store of each channel. Table (B.10) presents the average number of UPC codes bought in
stores owned by retailers associated with each channel.
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Table B.11: Differences in Grocery Baskets Across Income Groups in Trips to Same Retailer
Income Bracket Nb. of Fresh Produce in Basket std. dev.
[0, 45, 000) 1.05 .75
[45, 000− 70, 000) 1.32 1.14
≥ 70, 000 1.51 1.09
Table B.12: Differences in Grocery Baskets Across Income Groups in Trips to Grocer Part-
ner Firm
Income Bracket Nb. of Fresh Produce in Basket Std. dev.
[0− 45, 000) 1.41 1.06
[45, 000− 70, 000) 1.37 1.21
≥ 70, 000 1.60 1.20
Note: Table (B.11) presents the average and standard deviation of the number of fresh produce
items in bundles purchased by households in each income group. For each retailer visited by multiple
panelists of each income group, means in table (B.11) are calculated across panelists that visit the
same retailer. Table (B.12) shows means and standard deviations for the number of fresh produce
in the basket purchased for panelists that use the Grocer Partner service across income groups.
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Table B.13: Demographic Characteristics of Panelists
Sample Big Tech Users Grocer Partner Users
Under 30 years old 39.44 44.22 55.84
Under 50 years old 63.21 55.20 72.73
Single Female 26.47 31.79 42.86
Single Male 9.96 12.14 11.69
White 81.60 84.10 70.13
Black 10.46 8.38 20.78
Asian 3.16 3.17 1.30
Other (race) 4.77 4.05 7.79
Hispanic 6.46 8.96 10.39
Children Under 18 23.90 11.85 18.18
Active Internet 94.94 97.40 97.40
Highest Degree in Household:
Grade School 0.15 0.29 0.00
Some High School 0.98 0.16 0.00
Graduated High School 18.18 17.63 9.09
Some College 28.79 31.21 29.87
Graduated College 34.00 35.55 31.17
Post College Grad 17.90 14.16 29.87
Income < 45K 39.34 42.20 31.17
Income [45K, 70K) 24.89 27.75 32.47
Income ≥ 70K 35.77 30.06 36.36
Note: All variables are dummies. Hence, the table shows the proportion panelists with each demo-
graphic characteristic within each subgroup. The first column shows the proportions for the entire
set of Nielsen panelists in 2015-2016. Single female and male households are households with no
male head of household and no female head of household, respectively.
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Table B.14: Number of Grocery Stores Per Capita in Zip Codes of Different Income Levels
Income Group Zip Code Mean Std. dev.
Income < 45K .26 1.86
Income [45K - 70K) .28 1.89
Income > 70K .96 3.03
Table B.15: Number of Drug Stores in Zip Codes Per Capita of Different Income Levels
Income Group Zip Code Mean Std. dev.
Income < 45K .076 .729
Income [45K - 70K) .070 .551
Income > 70K .376 1.471
Table B.16: Number of General Merchandise Stores Per Capita in Zip Codes of Different
Income Levels
Income Group Zip Code Mean Std. dev.
Income < 45K 4.20 4.63
Income [45K - 70K) 3.28 3.62
Income > 70K 2.36 2.91
Note: Average income and population by zip code comes from the 2012-2016 American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates (ACS) and the number of retail establishments by NAICS code come from
the Zip Codes Business Patterns (ZBP) 2015.
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Figure B.4: Delivery Radius By Service
Note: Example of delivery radius for a metro area in the sample at the beginning of the sample
period. Zip codes in blue are uniquely served by Big Tech firm, zip codes in light green are uniquely
served by Grocer Partner firm and the dark green area corresponds to zip codes served by both
services.
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Figure B.5: Distribution of Partners Available on Grocer Partner Platform
Note: An observation is a zip code and the the number of retailers that fulfill deliveries to that zip
code though Grocer Partner’s platform.
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Figure B.6: Distribution of Minimum Distance Between Consumers and Grocer Partner
Affiliated Stores
Note: An observation is a zip code served by the Grocer Partner firm and the distance from that zip
code’s centroid to the closest store of a retailer that is a partner of Grocer Partner firm.
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Figure B.7: Distance to Stores and Number of Partners Available on Grocer Partner’s
Platform
Note: An observation is a zip code served by the Grocer Partner firm, a distance from that zip
code’s centroid to the closest store of a retailer that is a partner of Grocer Partner firm and the
number of retailers that fulfill deliveries to that zip code though Grocer Partner’s platform. This
graph displays the lowess regression aproximation of the relationship between distance from partner
stores and number of partners available.
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Figure B.8: Distance to Stores and Zip Code Income
Note: An observation is the mean income of households in each U.S. zip code and the number
of partners offered by the Grocer Partner service in that zip code. The mean household income
by zip code comes from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (ACS). This
graph displays the lowess regression approximation of the relationship between the number of partners
offered and the zip code mean household income.
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Figure B.9: Higher Differential Prices Induce Limited Switching
Note: This graph shows how consumers’ switching behavior relates to differences in prices across
platforms for the bundle purchased. Each observation is a price difference of the combined products
purchased compared to the other platform when the consumer has the opportunity to switch to
purchase the same bundle. The smoothed predicted probability is predicts whether the consumer
switched platforms, given the price difference of the bundle purchased.
Figure B.10: National Presence and Local Footprint of Same-day Grocery Delivery (2017)
Note: The map shows how Big Tech and Grocer Partner have country-wide presence. Entry
decisions across markets pinned occurs during 2012-2017 and are used in entry game estimation.
Each colored pin represents a different grocery delivery service. Big Tech is represented by blue
squares and Grocer Partner by green pins. Yellow and red pins represent two other grocery delivery
services with regional coverage presented for scale.
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Figure B.11: Big Tech Coverage around Fulfillment Center
Figure B.12: Grocer Partner Scattered Coverage around Stores
Note: Each map is an example of delivery radius for a metro area (Houston) showing how Big
Tech (left) has a contiguous delivery radius around its fulfillment center whereas Grocer Partner
(right) has often isolated pockets around partner stores.
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Figure B.13: Entry Costs and Total Population Served by Firm
Figure B.14: With Low Entry Costs, Grocer Partner Enters Smaller Markets Over Time
Note: The top graph shows how with low entry costs, Grocer Partner, grows its coverage faster
than Big Tech. The vertical line represents the date when Big Tech announces the first entry using
the brick-and-mortar grocery stores it acquires in 2017, allowing it to grow faster. The bottom
graph shows the average size in population in Grocer Partner’s expansions. By 2018, markets are
as small as 300 thousand people, showing how this firm’s cost relies little on market size.
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Figure B.15: Acquisition Lowers Big Tech Entry Costs inducing Faster Entry
Note: In February 2018, Big Tech starts making use of the newly acquired grocery stores as
delivery hubs. As a result, the figure shows how the firm is able to start operating in new markets
faster than before. Each observation is the sum of entry decision announcements made by Big Tech
in a month.
Figure B.16: The ”Big Tech Effect”: Grocer Partner Reacts to Acquisition with Faster
Entry
Note: In June 2017, Big Tech publicly announces the acquisition of a brick-and-mortar grocery
chain in Grocer Partner’s network of affiliated retailers. Each observation is the sum of entry
decision announcements made by Grocer Partner in a month.
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Table B.17: Effect of Big Tech and Grocer Partner Service Launches on Probability of
Grocery Store Purchase by Users of Each Service
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
VARIABLES < 45K [45K - 70K) > 70K
Grocer Partner Available * User -0.106*** -0.121*** -0.330***
(0.0177) (0.0402) (0.0227)
Big Tech Available * Big Tech User -0.352*** -0.114*** -0.0271*
(0.0310) (0.0111) (0.0140)
Constant 0.465*** 0.535*** 0.552***
(0.0187) (0.00710) (0.00737)
Household FE YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES
Observations 96,475 651,726 632,948
R-squared 0.035 0.021 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Observations include all trips to grocery stores, discount store and drug stores made by house-
holds in the 27 metro areas that contain Big Tech and Grocer Partner service users in 2015-2016.
For each trip, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the store visited belong to the Grocery channel.
Coefficients represent the change in the probability of a same-day delivery service user making a trip
to a grocery store after the this new service become available in their zip code.
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Table B.18: Effect of Big Tech and Grocer Partner Service Launches on Probability of
Discount Store Purchase by Users of Each Service
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
VARIABLES < 45K [45K - 70K) > 70K
Grocer Partner Available * User 0.0306 0.0787** -0.0277
(0.0319) (0.0342) (0.0190)
Big Tech Available * User -0.0759*** -0.107*** -0.106***
(0.0253) (0.00944) (0.0117)
Constant 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.154***
(0.0152) (0.00603) (0.00617)
Household FE YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES
Observations 96,475 651,726 632,948
R-squared 0.100 0.077 0.071
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Observations include all trips to grocery stores, discount store and drug stores made by house-
holds in the 27 metro areas that contain Big Tech and Grocer Partner service users in 2015-2016.
For each trip, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the store visited belong to the Discount Store
channel. Coefficients represent the change in the probability of a same-day delivery service user
making a trip to a discount store after the this new service become available in their zip code.
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Table B.19: Effect of Big Tech and Grocer Partner Service Launches on Probability of Drug
Store Purchase by Users of Each Service
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
VARIABLES < 45K [45K - 70K) > 70K
Grocer Partner Available * User 0.0248 0.000243 0.0239*
(0.0235) (0.0250) (0.0141)
Big Tech Available * User 0.00583* -0.0421*** -0.0173**
(0.00352) (0.00690) (0.00871)
Constant 0.0970*** 0.0664*** 0.0609***
(0.0126) (0.00441) (0.00457)
Household FE YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES
Observations 96,475 651,726 632,948
R-squared 0.081 0.066 0.057
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Observations include all trips to grocery stores, discount store and drug stores made by house-
holds in the 27 metro areas that contain Big Tech and Grocer Partner service users in 2015-2016.
For each trip, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the store visited belong to the Drug Store chan-
nel. Coefficients represent the change in the probability of a same-day delivery service user making
a trip to a drug store after the this new service become available in their zip code.
61
Table B.20: Effect of Offline Retail Availability on Probability of Grocer Partner Service
Usage
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
VARIABLES Grocer Partner Grocer Partner Grocer Partner
Distance to Closest Grocer Partner Affiliated Store (miles) -0.000384 0.00215*** 0.00170***
(0.000513) (0.000556) (0.000556)
Number of Grocer Partner Affiliated Available 0.00334*** 0.00329***
(0.000306) (0.000304)
Number of Stores within 1 mile -0.00370***
(0.000498)
Constant 0.0155*** -0.0271*** 0.0365***
(0.00309) (0.00495) (0.00987)
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890
R-squared 0.000 0.030 0.043
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Observations coincide with the sample of trips used in the estimation of the structural model in
chapter (2). Trips are a random sample of grocery, discount store and drug store purchases as well
as online purchases from the Grocer Partner and Big Tech services made by households in the 27
metro areas that contain Big Tech and Grocer Partner service users in 2015-2016. For each trip, the
dependent variable takes value 1 if the retailer corresponding to that purchase is the Grocer Partner
service. Coefficients represent the correlation of each variable with the probability of a consumer
using that service at any point in time.
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Table B.21: Effect of Offline Retail Availability on Probability of Big Tech Service Usage
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
VARIABLES Big Tech Big Tech Big Tech
Distance to Closest Grocer Partner Affiliated Store (miles) -0.00106 -0.000702 -0.000997
(0.000840) (0.000880) (0.000881)
Distance to Closest Store (miles) 0.00672*** 0.00751*** 0.00684***
(0.00165) (0.00174) (0.00175)
Number of Grocer Partner Affiliated Available 0.000685 0.000585
(0.000495) (0.000495)
Number of Stores within 1 mile -0.00318***
(0.000769)
Constant 0.00480 -0.00694 0.0510***
(0.00780) (0.0115) (0.0181)
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Observations coincide with the sample of trips used in the estimation of the structural model
in chapter (2). Trips are a random sample of grocery, discount store and drug store purchases as
well as online purchases from the Grocer Partner and Big Tech services made by households in the
27 metro areas that contain Big Tech and Grocer Partner service users in 2015-2016. For each trip,
the dependent variable takes value 1 if the retailer corresponding to that purchase is the Big Tech
service. Coefficients represent the correlation of each variable with the probability of a consumer
using that service at any point in time.
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Table B.22: Number of Purchases Using Online Delivery/ Year
Big Tech or Grocer Partner All Online retailers
Income > 70K 9.26 25.59
Income [45K, 70K) 7.61 19.94
Income < 45K 6.81 19.13
Table B.23: Consumer Surplus by Income Group ($): Big Tech
Surplus/ Purchase Surplus/ Year
Income > 70K 21.36 197.79
Income [45K, 70K) 13.64 103.80
Income < 45K 4.94 33.64
Weighted Average 12.85 131.20
Table B.24: Consumer Surplus by Income Group ($): Grocer Partner
Surplus/ Purchase Surplus/ Year
Income > 70K 13.94 129.08
Income [45K, 70K) 4.77 36.30
Income < 45K 1.41 9.60
Weighted Average 9.85 95.81
Note: The first table shows the household average number of purchases per year by income group.
The second and third tables show the consumer surplus induced by the new services estimated by the
model using estimates in column (2) table (B.34) and table (B.35). The annual values make use of
each consumer’s average yearly online delivery purchases.
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Table B.25: Grocer Partner Firm: Dollar Value per Purchase
Complementarity ($) Substitution ($)
Income > 70K 15.67 1.85
Income [45K, 70K) 9.27 2.83
Income < 45K 10.24 2.34
Table B.26: Grocer Partner Firm: Dollar Value per Year
Complementarity ($) Substitution ($)
Income > 70K 145.10 17.13
Income [45K, 70K) 70.54 21.54
Income < 45K 69.73 15.94
Table B.27: Big Tech Firm: Dollar Value per Purchase
Complementarity ($) Substitution ($)
Income > 70K 0 2.50
Income [45K, 70K) 0 3.83
Income < 45K 0 3.16
Table B.28: Big Tech Firm: Dollar Value per Year
Complementarity ($) Substitution ($)
Income > 70K 0 23.15
Income [45K, 70K) 0 29.15
Income < 45K 0 21.52
Note: This table shows the dollar value to consumers associated exclusively with the complementarity
and substitution channels relative to offline retail in the vicinity of their homes. The results presented
make use of the estimates in column (2) table (B.34) and table (B.35). The annual values make use
of each consumer’s average yearly online delivery purchases.
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Table B.29: What is the Offline ’Second Choice’ When Consumers Choose Big Tech
Channel of Second Choice Income < 45K Income [45K - 70K) Income > 70K
Discount Store X 1.3% 1.94%
Drug Store 8.16% 19.48% 12.62%
Grocery Store 91.84% 79.22% 85.44%
Table B.30: What is the Offline ’Second Choice’ When Consumers Choose Grocer Partner
Channel of Second Choice Income < 45K Income [45K - 70K) Income > 70K
Discount Store 22.22% 9.82% 7.00%
Drug Store 1.85% 9.38% 9.73%
Grocery Store 75.93% 80.80% 83.27%
Note: Table shows substitution patterns between the two delivery services and 3 offline channels.
The share of choices associated with each channel are presented when the two same-day delivery
services are removed from the choice set and retailer choices implied by the model are from one of
the 3 offline channels.
Table B.31: Biggest Losers: Top ’Second Choice’ Retailers
Second Choice Retailers Big Tech as Choice Grocer Partner as Choice
Largest Online Loser 33% 35%
Largest Grocery Loser 7.22% 2.92%
Largest Discount Loser 0.31 % 3.23%
Largest Drug Store Loser 3.35% 2.92%
Note: Table shows substitution patterns between the two delivery services and retailers from 3 offline
channels as well as the online channel. The share of choices associated with each channel are
presented when the two same-day delivery services are removed from the choice set.
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Table B.32: Switching Patterns: Evidence of Consumer Lock-in
s’ = no subscription s’ = Big Tech s’ = Grocer Partner
s = no subscription
Fraction of Purchases 99.83% 0.16% 0.01%
s = Big Tech
Fraction of Purchases 0.21% 99.61% 0.18%
s = Grocer Partner
Fraction of Purchases 0.29% 0.34% 99.37%
Note: From one purchase to the next, consumers tend to repeat their platform choice. Switching is
rare, representing less than 2% of all purchases. Statistics are based on platform user purchases in
2015-2017 across online and offline channels. s is the consumer’s subscription status inferred from
past purchases and s′ is the subscription choice inferred from the current purchase choice.
Table B.33: Switching Occurs When Subscriptions Expire
To Big Tech To Grocer Partner To no Subscription
Switch from Big Tech - 428 days 304 days
Switch from Grocer Partner 285 days - 82 days
Obs 2,411
Note: This table shows that consumers that do switch between services, do so around the time their
subscription is expected to expire. I calculate the average number of days since the consumer first
uses the service to when the consumer switches. Switching occurs approximately one or two years
after the first use. Grocer Partner can be used without a subscription and, consequently, switching
can occur earlier.
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Table B.34: Demand Model Estimates: Demographics
(1) (2)
Big Tech * Under 30 2.39 3.09
[2.36, 2.44] [3.04, 3.14]
Big Tech * Income [45K - 70K) 7.36 10.85
[7.24, 7.47] [10.65, 10.98]
Big Tech * Income > 70K 10.51 7.84
[10.34, 10.68] [7.64, 7.94]
Big Tech * Single Female 0.228 0.543
[0.225, 0.232] [0.532, 0.551]
Grocer Partner * Under 30 2.15 1.66
[2.12, 2.19] [1.62 1.69]
Grocer Partner * Income [45K - 70K) 0.00132 0.00081
[0.00130,0.00134] [0.00079, 0.00082]
Grocer Partner * Income > 70K 9.10 13.25
[8.96, 9.25] [12.97, 13.40]
Grocer Partner * Single Female 0.79 0.36
[0.78, 0.80] [0.35, 0.36]
Retailer Fixed-effects YES YES
η NO YES
68
Table B.35: Demand Model Estimates: Household Location, Travel Cost and Income-Price
Elasticity
(1) (2)
Big tech * Retailers < 1 mile -0.181
[-0.185, -0.179]
Big Tech * Retailers < 5 miles -0.041
[-0.040, -0.041]
Big Tech * Closest Store (miles) 0.461
[0.452, 0.467]
Grocer Partner * Retailers < 1 mile -0.979
[-0.995, -0.963]
Grocer Partner * Retailers < 5 miles 0.335
[0.329, 0.340]
Grocer Partner * Nb G Partners 1.428
[1.400, 1.444]
Grocer Partner * Closest Store (miles) 0.342
[0.335, 0.346]
Income * Price (10K) 0.572 0.569
[0.563, 0.581] [0.558, 0.568]
Travel Cost ($/mile) 0.56 0.55
[0.55, 0.57] [0.55, 0.56]
Retailer Fixed-effects YES YES
η NO YES
Note: This table shows demand coefficient estimates in dollar value of consumer demographic and
location characteristics interacted with the retailer fixed-effects for Big Tech and Grocer Partner. It
also shows coefficient estimates for consumers’ travel cost in dollar value per mile and for the inter-
action term between income and bundle price, showing how higher income users are less sensitive to
prices. Estimates are based on a random sample of 3,890 visits across all 4 channels: Grocery, Dis-
count Store, Drug Store and Online Shopping. Both specification include 35 retailer chain dummies
(fixed-effects). Confidence intervals of 95% from bootstrapping of approximated outer distribution.
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Table B.36: Demand Model Estimates: Switching Costs
s’ = Big Tech s’ = Grocer Partner
s = no subscription $ 4.50 $ 13.87
[4.13, 5.12] [12.89, 14.92]
s = Big Tech - $ 11.05
[8.13, 11.93]
s = Grocer Partner $ 6.74 -
[6.24, 7.54]
Subscription Fixed Cost 0.9 0.99
[0.76, 0.91] [0.97, 1.26]
Note: This table shows demand coefficient estimates of switching costs across services. Costs include
all fees in a per-purchase base as well as any other type of switching costs implicit in consumers’
decisions. Confidence intervals are computed using the confidence intervals on utility coefficients.
For each bound on first set of parameters, I solve for the second set of moments to get bounds on
switching costs. Estimates are based on a random sample of 3,890 visits across all 4 channels:
Grocery, Discount Store, Drug Store and Online Shopping. Both specification include 35 retailer
chain dummies (fixed-effects). Confidence intervals of 95% from bootstrapping of approximated outer
distribution.
Table B.37: Law of Motion of Subscribers With (left) and Without Switching Costs (right)
s′ = 0 s′ = B s′ = G
s = 0 0.9804 0.0134 0.0062
s = B 0.0074 0.9883 0.0042
s = G 0.0114 0.0048 0.9838
s′ = 0 s′ = B s′ = G
s = 0 0.6015 0.1082 0.2902
s = B 0.0227 0.6304 0.3469
s = G 0.2124 0.3142 0.4733
Note: Transition probability matrices across subscription choices s ∈ {No Subscription (0), Big
Tech (B), Grocer Partner (G)} predicted by the demand model when consumers have (left) and
don’t have (right) switching costs. Probabilities are calculated using all consumers in sample,
across all markets.
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FC Size (sq-ft) -19.298
(1.116)





Partners (Fixed Cost) -0.068
(0.005)




Note: This table shows coefficient estimates of firms’ flow profit parameters. Revenues are the
firm’s customer base times an average revenue per customer previously calibrated based on
subscription fees and a gross margin on consumers’ mean purchase expenditures.
Table B.39: Entry Costs
Big Tech -72.746
(12.455)
Big Tech * Time 9.822
(1.469)
Grocer Partner - First Entry -5.244
(0.821)
Grocer Partner * Time 35.239
(3.924)
Grocer Partner - Expansion -5.548
(2.487)
Note: This table shows coefficient estimates of firms’ entry costs with linear time effect on those
costs. Entry costs are high for Big Tech and much lower for Grocer Partner. For both firms, entry
costs fall over time.
71
Table B.40: Strategic Entry Timing versus Commitment
Lock-in and Competition Pre-Commitment
Average Time to Entry Big Tech 3.55 4.68
Average Time to Entry Grocer Partner 3.97 5.20
Total Number of Obs 169 169
Note: This table shows that, in the competitive equilibrium with lock-in, Big Tech enters markets
on average 3.55 years after the beginning of the game in June 2012. Grocer Partner’s entry and
expansion decisions take on average 3.97 years to occur after the beginning of the game in this
equilibrium. For both firms, the average time taken to enter is approximately 1.2 years later when
they commit to entry times.
Table B.41: Early versus Late Entry Payoffs
%∆ Average Payoff Big Tech 10.84 %
%∆ Average Payoff Grocer Partner 31.34%
Number of Delayed Entries Big Tech 79
Number of Delayed Entries Grocer Partner 66
Total Efficiency loss 20.17%
Total Number of Obs 169
Note: This table shows firms’ gain from delayed entry in terms of percentage payoff change and the
number of markets in which entry would be delayed in the pre-commitment equilibrium relative to
the equilibrium with lock-in and competition.
Table B.42: Big Tech Acquires Brick-and-Mortar Grocery Chain: Entry Timing Counterfactual
Post-Merger (2018-2019) No Merger
Average Time to Entry Big Tech 6.18 8.69
Average Time to Entry Grocer Partner 4.73 6.87
Total Number of Obs 30 30
Note: This table shows how the acquisition between Big Tech and the grocery chain induced faster
entry across new markets entered after June 2017 for both firms relative to the counterfactual
where the acquisition did not occur. Big Tech enters these markets on average 6.18 years after the
beginning of the game in June 2012. The results show that Grocer Partner reacts to this acquisition
entering over 2 years earlier than it would otherwise to benefit from consumer lock-in.
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Table B.43: Big Tech Acquires Brick-and-Mortar Grocery Chain: Consumer Welfare Gains and
Producer Losses
%∆ Average Payoff Big Tech 10.05 %
%∆ Average Payoff Grocer Partner 6.41 %
Number of Anticipated Entries Big Tech 28
Number of Anticipated Entries Grocer Partner 27
Total Loss of Early Entry 624 ($ M)
Total Consumer Welfare Gain 846 ($ M)
Total Number of Obs 30
Note: This table shows how the timing of entry with and without the acquisition compare in terms
of costs for firms and consumer welfare. Loss of early entry includes Grocer Partner’s cost of
accelerating entry due to the acquisition and the cost Big tech would have incurred with the
post-merger entry timing with its original cost structure. The latter approximates the portion of the
value payed for the acquisition associated with increased entry speed ability. Consumer gains are
from early entry across new markets.
Table B.44: Merger between Big Tech and Grocer Partner: Monopoly Counterfactual
Monopolist’s Average Time to Entry 10.10
Share of Markets with Big Tech Business model 20.64%
Efficiency Gain 1.66 ($ B)
Welfare Loss 2.04 ($ B)
Total Number of Obs 169
Note: This table shows how a potential merger between Big Tech and Grocer Partner would induce
slower entry timing. it would take the monopolist on average more than 6 years longer to enter
markets that received either or both services during 2012-2017. The monopolist chooses the most
profitable business model by market. Gain from monopoly accounts for cost savings from lack of
early entry and efficiency gains due to scale economies.
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